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Nonprofit Organizations and 
the Intersectoral Division of Labor in the Arts 
Paul DiMaggio 
Princeton University 
This chapter takes stock of what we know about the role of nonprofit enterprise in the 
production and distribution of the arts (broadly defined), primarily in the United States.  
After briefly discussing measurement, I present data on the extent of nonprofit activity in 
a range of cultural subfields.  I then review theoretical explanations of the prevalence of 
nonprofits in cultural industries and discuss some puzzles existing theories do not ade-
quately solve.   After reviewing research and theory about behavioral differences between 
nonprofit and for-profit arts firms, I explore how the arts-and-cultural sector is evolving 
in the face of demographic change, the weakening of cultural hierarchy, and the emerg-
ence of new production and distribution technologies.  I conclude with a research agenda.   
My perspective is ecological in that I believe that the nonprofit sector’s role can 
best be understood in the context of the intersectoral division of labor.  I define the arts 
very broadly defined to include works associated with high, popular, and folk cultures: 
Othello, Married with Children, and outdoor religious drama; Swan Lake, clogging, and 
Las Vegas chorus lines; and the works of Rembrandt,  Native American craft artists, and 
Cassius Marcellus Coolidge.  This chapter does not cover types of  culture excluded from 
the arts so defined, such as science, religion, law, cuisine, industrial design, architecture 
or the humanities. 
  Organizations in the field of culture and the arts represent a small share of total 
nonprofit activity (2.3 percent of revenues and 1.9 percent of employment) (Weitzman et DiMaggio: Culture ---2--- 
al. 2002: xxxiii).  Moreover, they tend to include more very small organizations and few-
er large ones than most other nonprofit fields (Seley and Wolpert 2002: 14).  But the non-
profit arts sector has been growing: rates of increase in both employment and revenues 
between 1987 and 1997 exceeded those in the fields of  health, education, religion, social 
services, civic associations and private foundations (Weitzman et al. 2002: xxxiii, 42).   
The number of nonprofit arts and cultural organizations filing returns with the Internal 
Revenue Service also rose sharply (though not more than nonprofits in other fields) dur-
ing the 1990s, from 17,290 in 1992 to 23,779 in 1998 (Weitzman et al. 2002, Table 5.6).
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Nonprofit cultural organizations are distinctive in that they rely more on individual donat-
ions (and on volunteering) and less on government grants and contracts than nonprofits in 
most other fields (Brooks 2003).   Especially in the performing arts, earned income also 
accounts for a large share of revenue. 
Where are Nonprofit Sectors Prevalent? 
In what industries is the nonprofit sector prevalent?   This question is more complex than 
it seems, especially if we wish to compare the roles of nonprofit and commercial entities 
engaged in providing broadly similar artistic services.   
Dilemmas of Measurement and Enumeration 
Before presenting the evidence we must take a brief detour into measurement and meth-
odology.  As we illuminate sectors of the arts that statistical systems ordinarily obscure, 
we shall begin to see the nonprofit arts sector as less professional and more participatory, 
less restricted to high culture and more widely spread throughout the cultural hierarchy, 
and less limited to the grand museum or concert hall and more ubiquitously integrated 
into our homes, schools, churches, and everyday lives.     DiMaggio: Culture ---3--- 
Several methodological problems cloud our vision of the sector.  First, for histor-
ical reasons, data on nonprofit and for-profit cultural organizations are often collected 
separately and therefore difficult to compare.  Second, nonprofit and commercial cultural 
enterprise are typically organized in different ways, which also makes comparison diffic-
ult.  (Nonprofit arts organizations tend to internalize functions that the commercial sector 
accomplishes through contracting among separate entities [Heilbron and Gray 2001].)   
Finally, institutional factors render some organizations more likely to be counted 
than others even when their structures are comparable.   Weakly institutionalized organiz-
ational forms, and organizations that depart from accepted forms in arts fields that  are 
strongly institutionalized, are often socially and statistically invisible.  Nonprofit cultural 
programs embedded within organizations that are not generally considered producers or 
distributors of the arts pose a special problem.  Churches and universities are active arts 
presenters, often the most important outside of metropolitan areas.  The 1999 National 
Congregational Survey reported that large majorities of U.S congregations sponsor regul-
arly performing choir or other musical groups.   Many churches present theater perform-
ances, sponsor book circles, organize trips to performing-arts events, or even provide re-
hearsal space for performing-arts groups in the wider community (Chaves 1999; Chaves 
and Marsden 2000).  But because their artistic programs are small relative their many 
other functions, church arts programs, like those of universities, rarely show up when 
cultural activity is measured.   Community-based arts activities are likewise often spon-
sored by nonprofit organizations with broader mandates (e.g. community-development or 
youth-assistance programs) and are therefore undercounted in canvasses of arts providers 
as well (Grams and Warr 2002). DiMaggio: Culture ---4--- 
The most elusive cultural organizations from the standpoint of enumeration are 
“minimalist organizations”: unincorporated associations with minimal or intermittent 
program activities, part-time or volunteer staff, and tiny budgets (Halliday et al. 1987).   
Such tiny groups play important roles in many fields: training young artists, presenting 
difficult or innovative work, or serving audiences that may not ordinarily attend more est-
ablished arts nonprofits (Jeffri 1980).   Much informal activity ---  e.g., musicians who 
enjoy playing together, then name themselves and perform an occasional public concert; 
the collector who opens his or her home and collection to strangers for a few hours each 
week --- edges almost imperceptibly into formal organization, and may just as easily edge 
out again.  The problem is not unique to the arts: similarly fluid boundaries divide in-
formal temporary childcare and organized daycare centers.  But it is especially pervasive 
in much of the art world (Stern and Seifert 2000b).    
How Many Organizations Do Standard Data Sources Miss?  How many nonprofit 
arts organizations would we discover if we had as reliable data on embedded and minim-
alist organizations as on more well established nonprofit entities?   A few local studies 
that made heroic efforts to enumerate less visible regions of the nonprofit sector provide a 
basis for rough estimation.  One study based on IRS Form 990 data on nonprofit theaters, 
opera companies, and orchestras that were members of their respective service organizat-
ions, found that 20 percent of the theaters and opera companies, and 40 percent of the 
orchestras were missing from the IRS files.  The researchers attributed much of the dif-
ference to cases “in which the organization was part of another nonprofit institution” 
(Bowen et al.: 219), a problem that would affect Census of Business counts as well.   A 
study of 501(c)3 nonprofit arts organizations in three large metropolitan areas that pro-DiMaggio: Culture ---5--- 
duce and exhibit the arts collected information on embedded as well as freestanding non-
profits from many sources.   These researchers enumerated more than twice as many non-
profit entities as appeared in the same categories in the IRS Business Master File (Kaple 
et al. 1996: 165).   A contemporaneous study of one of the cities (Philadelphia)  went 
further to collect data on small, unincorporated, community-based associations, which 
swell the roster of nonprofit cultural entities even more (Stern 2000: Table 1).
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  It may be useful to think of the nonprofit arts-and-cultural sector as comprising 
three rings.  An inner core includes arts-and-cultural organizations (as classified under 
the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities [NTEE]) that are incorporated under section 
501(c)3 of the IRS code.  A second ring adds arts and cultural organizations or programs 
“embedded” in 501(c)3 nonprofits that fall outside of the NTEE’s “arts-and-culture” 
heading.  A third ring includes unincorporated associations that share both the purposes 
and the noncommercial orientation of their incorporated counterparts.  If Philadelphia is 
typical, the number of entities doubles and the distributions of size, sponsorship and 
missions change at each step outward from the core.  Because organizations in the inner 
core are  better documented than those in the outer circles, we must keep the latter in 
mind lest we propagate a distorted view of the nonprofit arts sector and its social role. 
The nonprofit role by subsector.  The best comparative data on the roles of 
nonprofit and for-profit organizations in different arts-and-cultural industries and 
subsectors come from the 1997 U.S. Economic Census, which distinguishes between tax-
exempt (including nonprofit and some public entities) and taxable (for-profit) est-
ablishments in several fields.   The Census is not a perfect source by any means: in 
addition to missing embedded, minimalist, and poorly institutionalized organizations, it DiMaggio: Culture ---6--- 
lumps together public and private nonprofits, some categories (e.g., museums) are 
aggregated at higher levels than we might wish, and it assumes (without asking) that 
firms in some industries are all for-profit.  I shall draw on other sources of information 
throughout this chapter, but, as long as we remain aware of its limitations, the Census 
provides the best single overview.
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Figure 1: The World of Noncommercial Arts Activities 
 
 
Table 1 and Figure 2 report the percentage of producers and distributors that are 
nonprofit organizations in each of several broadly defined arts industries, as well as the 
nonprofit share of revenues where such information is available.  I present these data 
here, first, to describe the broad outlines of the nonprofit sector’s role in the arts; and, 
second, to establish a set of cases that we can use to evaluate theories that attempt to 
explain variation among industries in the intersectoral division of labor.    
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  Figure 2 provides an overview at a glance.   To the right, we see industries that 
are almost entirely nonprofit: resident theaters, symphony orchestras, opera companies, 
chamber music groups, modern dance companies, historic sites (actually mixed nonprofit 
and public sector), and community theater, all over 90 percent nonprofit.   Nonprofit 
organizations also dominate the fields of ballet, art museums (again mixed public and 
private), choral music, stock theater, and children’s theater.   





















































  By contrast, commercial enterprise accounts for more than 90 percent of dinner 
theaters, dance schools, dance or stage bands, jazz ensembles, and other music groups 
and artists.  For-profit companies also dominate Broadway theater, touring theater com-
panies, and circuses.
4  Art, drama and music schools, Off-Broadway theater, folk-ethnic 
dance companies and Off-Off Broadway theater are mixed in organizational form.   DiMaggio: Culture ---8--- 
               
NAICS 
Code 














7111102  Producers of live the-
atrical productions
1 
  2893  3225537  51.8  36.6 
  Self-designated:  Resident theatres
1  140  385837  97.1  99.5 
    Stock theatres
1  102  72969  81.4  89.4 
    Broadway product-
ions & Road
1 
167  **  18.6  ** 
    Off-Broadway 
productions
1 
79  97498  62.0  43.6 
    Off-off-Broadway 
productions
1 
131  114774  77.1  57.2 
    Children’s theatre
1  187  77458  78.1   
    Dinner theatre
1  45  **  2.2  ** 
    Community 
theatre
1 
478  131550  91.2  89.5 
    Other theatrical 
presentation
1 
309  241698  35.3  22.4 
  Not self-designated:  All other producers 
of live theatrical 
presentations
1 
1255  1082151  32.5  22.9 
711 pt.  Other theatrical 
producers & services
1 
  3479  4912754  18.0  21.1 
7111200  Dance groups & 
artists
1 
  530  432690  68.5  74.7 
  Self-designated:  Ballet company
1  146  184745  89.7  99.0 
    Modern dance 
company
1 
96  51423  93.8  95.9 
    Folk/ethnic dance 
company
1 
23  14861  73.9  21.6 




69  44795  20.3  6.4 
  Not self-designated:  All other dance 
groups & artists
1 
196  136866  60.7  62.2 





  975  **  86.2  ** 
  Self-designated:  Opera company
1  122  539986  94.3  99.7 
    Symphony 
orchestra
1 
451  896370  94.7  98.3 
    Chamber music 
organization
1 
150  69164  94.0  98.9 
  Not self-designated:  All other 
symphony 
252  **  64.3  ** 
Table 1: Arts Establishments: Percentage of Firms that are Tax-Exempt and Tax-Exempt Firms’ 
Percentage of Receipts/Revenues by Category*  







7111309  Other music groups & 
artists
1 
  3775  2248281  13.6  5.2 
NAICS 
Code 














  Self-designated:  Dance or stage 
band or orchestra
1 
279  85801  5.7  2.6 
    Choral music 
group
1 
239  85353  88.3  46.6 
    Jazz music groups 
or artists
1 
159  69254  7.5  11.0 




1326  1233131  4.6  1.6 
  Not self-designated:  All other music 
groups and artists
1 
1772  774742  12.0  5.9 
711 pt.  Other entertainers & 
entertainment groups
1 
  4018  3076520  1.7  0.8 
7111901  Circuses
2    87  289048  19.5  7.2 
             
71211  Museums & art 
galleries
2 
  3860  4788424  89.0  94.6 
71212  Historic sites
2    892  370068  91.3  92.6 
             
6116101  Dance schools
3    5367  781732  5.0  8.4 
6116102  Art, drama, and music 
schools
3 




*Number of establishments reflects those in business at any time in 1997. 
Revenues for taxable establishments are “receipts”; for tax-exempts, “revenues.”  
“Self-designated” establishments are those that responded to a mailed inquiry.  
Information on “non-self-designated” was gathered from administrative records.
**Data suppressed by Census Bureau due to risk of identifying particular 
establishment. 
1 Source: data are based on from special tabulations from the 1997 Economic 
Census, prepared by the Census Bureau for the National Endowment for the 
Table 1 (continued)  DiMaggio: Culture ---10--- 
  For the most part, whichever form dominates in number of establishments is even 
more dominant in its share of receipts.  There are three notable exceptions to this rule, 
however.  Nonprofits account for just 39 percent of art, drama and music schools, but 58 
percent of revenues in this field.  Commercial entities account for just 12 percent of 
choral music groups, but these relatively few for-profit companies absorb more than half 
of the field’s revenues.  Similarly, just one in four ethnic dance companies is for-profit, 
but these garner almost 80 percent of the revenues.   Smaller biases favor for-profits in 
the Off-Broadway and Off-Off Broadway theater.  
  To summarize, nonprofit (and public) organizations are hegemonic in the fields of 
art and historic exhibition; and nonprofits have a lock on the most prestigious regions of 
the performing arts.  Other fields within the performing arts – for the most part those 
which, like jazz or ethnic dance, have won critical respect and scholarly attention relat-
ively recently or, like pop music or dinner theater, still await it – are dominated by for-
profit firms.  In still other fields – arts education, circus, several kinds of theaters – 
commercial and nonprofit enterprise compete.   Interestingly, while nonprofits compete 
with for-profits in some fields and public enterprises in others, in no industry do we find 
concentrations of public and commercial enterprise without large nonprofit sectors. 
 How might these patterns be explained?  Let us examine some theories that 
together can cast light on this complex array of statistics.   
Three Explanations for the Intersectoral Division of Labor in the Arts 
There are three kinds of scholarly accounts of the division of labor between nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations in the arts.  One emphasizes the failure of markets to provide 
sufficient incentive for capitalists to invest in cultural enterprises that produce socially DiMaggio: Culture ---11--- 
valued goods and services, and the need for philanthropic and government subsidy to 
which such market failure leads.   A second set focuses less on the need for subsidy than 
on the way that the organization of production and contracting in the arts poses specific 
problems that nonprofit organizations are well equipped to solve.  A third perspective 
takes an historical approach, emphasizing the varying uses to which entrepreneurial 
artists and patrons have sought to put the nonprofit form in different eras.   
  Market-failure approaches.  The most venerable explanation for the prevalence of 
nonprofit organizations in some arts sectors is also a central justification for government 
subsidy: namely, that the best art costs more to produce or exhibit than people are willing 
to pay.   For most exhibiting institutions, the economics behind this assertion are clear: 
Art museums face huge fixed costs for building maintenance, security, conservation and 
exhibition.   For large urban arts museums there is no price at which the number of visit-
ors would generate sufficient revenue to cover these costs.   The same is true of the live 
performing arts, as well: symphony orchestras concerts and Wagnerian opera, for examp-
le, are inherently expensive to produce, at least in the style to which audiences and critics 
are accustomed.  Again, there is no price, it is argued, at which revenues will meet costs.
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Given this, so the story goes, it is crucial for government to promote the public good by 
subsidizing arts organizations so that their survival becomes economically feasible.   
  The most ingenious variant of this argument is the cost-disease theory that econ-
omists William Baumol and William Bowen put forward in their landmark study The 
Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma.  In their account, the plight of performing-arts 
firms can only worsen.   The largest component of a performing-arts organizations’ budg-
et comprises labor costs for performers, technicians, set designers and other highly skilled DiMaggio: Culture ---12--- 
workers.  Because live performances take place in real time and in one location, there are 
few ways to increase productivity.  Yet arts organizations compete for employees in the 
same labor market as firms that can and do use technology to boost productivity, and 
these latter pass on some of the gains to employees in higher wages.   Constrained to keep 
up with rising labor costs in the economy at large, but unable to boost revenues by raising 
productivity, performing-arts groups fall ever further behind (Baumol and Bowen 1966).    
  Market failure approaches explain why, given stable aesthetic conventions, non-
profit arts organizations require subsidy to survive.  They cannot, however, explain why 
arts organizations get the subsidies they need.  Demand for many artistic goods and ser-
vices (most touring light-opera performances, slides for kinetoscopes, mechanical player 
pianos) has fallen below the level necessary to support the survival of firms that produce 
them.  How then can we explain the persistence of nonprofit arts organizations in the face 
of adverse market conditions?  For that we need a theory of demand for public goods.   
We find such a theory in another type of market-failure explanation, which 
addresses not just the question of why the market does not work, but also the secondary 
issue of why we have private nonprofit as well as public provision of cultural goods and 
services.  By this argument, noncommercial organizations (including  arts organizations) 
provide “collective consumption goods,” the benefits of which cannot be limited to those 
who pay for them.  Most arts programs (exhibits, performances, community projects) are 
“mixed goods” with both private and collective features.  People who buy tickets to 
orchestra concerts or participate in neighborhood mural projects, for example, capture 
some unique benefits (for example, entertainment or artistic training).  But the rest of us 
benefit (whether we pay or not) from the survival of orchestras and the music they play or DiMaggio: Culture ---13--- 
from the presence of murals in our communities (Throsby 2001).  Because most ticket 
buyers will pay a price that covers only their private benefit, revenues fail to reflect the 
true value (private plus collective) of a performance.  Only government, with its power to 
tax, can step in to make up the difference with subsidy (Weisbrod 1990). 
  According to public-choice theory, democratic governments provide subsidies 
that reflect the demand for public or mixed goods (or services) of the “median voter”: the 
person in the middle of the range of values that voters place upon the good in question.  
Where demand for a good or service develops gradually, the first citizens who care about 
it will create voluntary associations to satisfy their demand.  As incomes rise and demand 
increases to the point that the median voter desires the good or service, government ent-
ers the picture.  At this point, citizens who want more than the median voter continue to 
subsidize private voluntary organizations to supplement the quantity or quality of  gov-
ernment production.  As people get wealthier still, they may substitute private goods for 
collective goods (Weisbrod 1990), as occurred when many U.S. cities stopped supporting 
municipal bands as sales of phonograph records increased in the 1920 and 1930s.     
  The public-choice model can be generalized to heterogeneity not only in the 
amount of demand but in the nature of demand, as well.   Thus ethnic, religious, or polit-
ical heterogeneity may induce nonprofit rather than public supply of collective goods, if 
members of different groups want different types of programming (James 1987).  Locat-
ional variation may matter, as well: Where demand is geographically lumpy, the role of 
local government will exceed that of national government, and regional differences in the 
role of nonprofit sectors will also be greater.      DiMaggio: Culture ---14--- 
  Industrial-organization approaches.  Even if we grant that (again given convent-
ionally accepted standards of quality and craft) many nonprofit arts organizations cannot 
support their activities out of earned revenues, and that, furthermore, heterogeneity of de-
mand means that government will supply fewer exhibitions, classes, and performances 
than many citizens desire, we still need to explain what it is about the nonprofit form that 
makes it such an attractive instrument for bringing demand and supply into balance.  The 
availability of subsidy is an obvious answer, but many nonprofits in the arts sector get 
relatively little by way of government or foundation aid, especially compared to the 
money they raise from private individuals.  Moreover, we still need to explain why gov-
ernment chooses to give grants to nonprofits (and to provide the tax deductibility that 
subsidizes private contributions to them) in the first place.   
Economists who study organization and contracting have proposed additional 
reasons that the nonprofit form solves the problems of cultural organizations, especially 
those in the performing arts.  These arguments emphasize the ways in which the non-
profit form enables arts organizations to make credible commitments to, and thereby in-
duce the trust of, contributors and volunteers.   
Hansmann (1981) argued that performing-arts organizations facing insufficient 
revenues to mount the quality of work to which they aspire use the nonprofit form to take 
advantage of variability in demand for their product.  Whereas starving music students 
labor to find $20 for standing room, wealthy patrons who believe that opera’s survival is 
essential for civilization will pay much more.  One can tap a limited portion of this vari-
ability by charging different prices for different types of seat.   But one can exploit much 
more of it by operating two markets: one for tickets and one for contributions (often sold DiMaggio: Culture ---15--- 
as memberships of different kinds, pegged to the size of annual gifts).   Hansmann argues 
that  arts groups must adopt the nonprofit form to assure subscribers and patrons that they 
will use contributed funds for program purposes, rather than to line their own pockets.
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Caves (2000: 225ff) suggests an additional mechanism that helps to explain the 
prevalence of nonprofits in some performing-arts industries.  Performing-arts companies 
compete for services of the most talented performers.  Many such artists, Caves argues, 
are as concerned with working conditions (especially the amount of creative control that 
they can exercise over their work) as with income.  It is difficult to specify contractually 
the relative voice of artists and businesspeople in making decisions that affect artistic 
quality.  Nonprofit status serves as a signal to artists that a performing-arts firm will be 
more likely to accord artistic values high importance.  In other words, because both 
patrons and artists perceive nonprofits as sharing their own values and interests to a 
greater degree than businesses, nonprofits have privileged access to each. 
Still other economists, drawing on “club theory,” view governance as the key to 
understanding the effectiveness of the nonprofit form (Kuan 2001).  A relatively small 
number of committed stakeholders provide most of the contributed income or labor 
power (or both) for many cultural organizations, especially small ones.   Such stake-
holders – who may be customers with a strong preference for quality levels that a profit-
maximizing entrepreneur would not provide, or artists who are committed to work for 
which a large market does not yet exist – create nonprofits to meet this demand.   By 
forming a board comprising themselves or like-minded persons, they ensure that their 
aesthetic preferences will constrain business decisions and, at the same time, create a 
structure for inducing ongoing contributions.   DiMaggio: Culture ---16--- 
New forms of cultural nonprofits emerge in response to new organizational prob-
lems.  Thus Frey (1994) explains explosive growth in the number of nonprofit perform-
ing-arts festivals in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s as the result of attractive organiz-
ational properties  that solved economic and regulatory problems that weighed heavily on 
government-sponsored performing-arts groups.   In addition to benefiting from tourism 
(by locating in attractive travel destinations), nonprofit festivals employ the for-profit 
technique of short-term contracting for artistic talent (which they can do because they op-
erate in the summer, when other organizations are dark) to reduce fixed costs,  minimize 
risk, and avoid unions and government regulation. 
Historical/political approaches.  Market-failure theories explain why some arts 
organizations require subsidy.  The industrial-organization literature explains the advant-
ages that the nonprofit form presents to organizations whose managers hope to attract 
grants or contributions.  But neither explains the particular cultural fields in which non-
profit entrepreneurs have been active or the reasons for their success.     
To understand such patterns we need to attend to history and politics.   History is 
important because opportunities for successful entrepreneurship vary over time and be-
cause the sequence in which different types of artists and patrons adopted the nonprofit 
form both created models and limited opportunities for their successors.   Politics matters 
because the ability of artistic communities to take advantage of the nonprofit form de-
pends on power and influence as much as need.   Seen from an historical perspective, in-
tersectoral divisions of labor that appear natural today reflect the past capacity of partic-
ular groups to mobilize entrepreneurial resources. DiMaggio: Culture ---17--- 
In the 19
th-century U.S., urban upper classes found trustee-governed nonprofit arts 
organizations to be useful tools for defining a prestigious status culture to which they and 
their children would have privileged access.   For these emerging elites, symphony orch-
estras and art museums were an important component of an institutional complex that in-
cluded prep schools, universities, private libraries and exclusive social clubs.
7   The non-
profit form (which as Hall, this volume, demonstrates was less clearly differentiated from 
its proprietary counterpart in the late 19
th century than it is today), was attractive to muse-
um and orchestra founders because it provided a stable framework for an arduous process 
of clarifying the distinctions between art, on the one hand, and entertainment and fashion, 
on the other; and because trustee governance ensured that the founders would remain sec-
urely in control.   As I have argued elsewhere (DiMaggio 1982; see also Levine 1990), 
the very strength of the conceptual distinction between high culture and popular enter-
tainment throughout much of the 20
th century was itself a product of the institutional dif-
ferentiation of nonprofit and proprietary enterprise.  
The first part of the 20
th century witnessed a diffusion of the trustee-governed 
nonprofit arts, first to smaller cities across the United States and then to certain arts 
(opera, theater, contemporary art, the dance) that had previously been organized along 
commercial lines.  Entrepreneurial patrons in these disciplines, often excluded by virtue 
of religion, ethnicity, or gender from the elite networks from whom the trustees of 
orchestras and encyclopedic art museums were selected, explicitly emulated the in-
stitutional design of the museums and orchestras, though for many years they were 
unable to attain the same degree of wealth, prestige, or stability (DiMaggio 1992).  DiMaggio: Culture ---18--- 
  Artists, especially artists of color, were notably absent from the ranks of the non-
profit cultural entrepreneurs during the first half of the 20
th century.  Nor did such new art 
forms as film or photography receive much nonprofit sponsorship at first.   Yet the non-
profit form was not solely the reserve of the wealthy.  During the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries, immigrant groups created many voluntary associations devoted to communal 
cultural practice (e.g., the ubiquitous turerereins of the German immigrant communities) 
or commercial enterprises with cultural missions (the Yiddish theaters, parts of the im-
migrant press) that provided communal vehicles for artistic and cultural expression.  Est-
ablished charities (e.g., Chicago’s Hull House and other settlements) and associations 
(e.g., the National Federation of Women’s Clubs) were also active in the arts. 
  By the 1950s, the contours of the intersectoral division of labor in the arts were 
well defined.   All that remained was to fill them in, a project epitomized by the Ford 
Foundation’s arts program, which in the 1960s and 1970s engaged in massive institution-
building efforts in the fields of theater and dance.   The expansion of the role of the feder-
al government in the 1960s and 1970s disrupted what turned out to be a surprisingly frag-
ile equilibrium, however, by providing incentives and opportunities for adoption of the 
nonprofit form by groups that had been unable to use it in the past.   By the time the tide  
of federal expansion was turned back in the 1980s, an institutional framework of state 
and local arts agencies, private foundations, and corporate funders had emerged to sustain 
a range of purposes that were foreign to the aesthetic traditionalism that had characterized 
most U.S. art patronage (with some notable exceptions in New York and a few other 
urban centers) through 1960.    DiMaggio: Culture ---19--- 
  The rise of institutional patronage coincided with the unintended production of a 
mass market for serious art due to the largest educational expansion in American history 
during the 1960s.  Education has been the best predictor of interest in the sorts of arts ex-
periences that nonprofits provide for as long as anyone has studied the topic, so doubling 
of the percentage of Americans attending college provided a major demand-side stimulus 
at precisely the moment that an unprecedented infusion of grants and contracts bolstered 
the supply side.  The expansion of higher education (and the concomitantly greater role 
of universities as arts presenters) also contributed to an overproduction of artists (relative 
previous numbers and the market for their services) during the post-Vietnam era.   Not 
only were artists underemployed but, being college educated, they had the skills to create 
and administer nonprofit organizations and, in some cases, the networks to receive mod-
est but important grant support from state or local arts agencies.  These factors contribut-
ed to an unprecedented increase in the number of nonprofit cultural organizations.    
  Institutional patronage worked in at least four ways to expand the scope of the 
nonprofit arts after the 1960s.  First, it provided direct incentives to adopt the nonprofit 
form in industries where small enterprises became eligible for government and foundat-
ion grants that could make a big difference.   For example, whereas almost all small 
presses were proprietary before the 1970s, new literary presses often incorporated as non-
profits (and some old one converted to the nonprofit form) in order to become eligible for 
grants.   Second, institutional patronage provided legitimacy to art forms that had been 
effectively shut out of the nonprofit sector because of their lack of access to philanthropic 
capital.   Whereas private donors may spend their money however they want, government 
must justify its funding priorities.   Ignoring jazz, craft and folk art, and other parts of the DiMaggio: Culture ---20--- 
American living cultural heritage was difficult to justify.  Moreover, such art forms were 
attractive investments for arts agencies in states that had few orchestras, art museums and 
theater companies.  Although the amount of funding going to organizations in such fields, 
institutional patronage opened the door to nonprofit entrepreneurs in these areas.     
  Third, the scope and client base of nonprofit arts programs grew in response to 
what Lester Salamon (1987) has called “third-party government”: the choice by govern-
ments to pay nonprofits to carry out programs that public agencies might otherwise have 
undertaken themselves.  The expansion of federal social programs in the 1970s (and of 
state programs later on) provided funds for arts programs that emphasized the utility of 
the arts for such purposes as community empowerment, economic development, or the 
salvation of “at-risk youth.”   Finally, the rise of institutional subsidy led to a mobilizat-
ion of arts constituencies that enhanced the capacity of artists and their supporters to pur-
sue shared interests.   An early priority of the National Endowment for the Arts was to 
create a network that would support its requests for larger appropriations, for which pur-
pose it employed congressionally mandated pass-through grants to any state that created a 
state arts agency.   By the early 1970s all the states had done so, and many of these agen-
cies were themselves encouraging the proliferation of local arts agencies throughout their 
states, as well as advocacy groups (in which staff or trustees of their grantees often 
played central roles.   Although attempts to influence the legislative process were often 
ineffective, a by-product of these efforts was the production of a discourse that high-
lighted the instrumental value of the arts and justified the missions of nonprofits that used 
the arts in the service of education and community building.   DiMaggio: Culture ---21--- 
  For all these reasons – the expansion of government’s role (and the shift from 
direct government service provision to contracting with nonprofit third parties), the rise 
of public and other forms of institutional funding of the arts, the explosion of higher edu-
cation, and the oversupply of artists –- the groups that were interested in and capable of 
using the nonprofit form to pursue artistic missions, and the nature of these missions 
themselves, became markedly more diverse during the latter third of the 20
th century.    
  We can draw five general lessons from this narrative.   First, we should be caut-
ious in modeling the division of labor between nonprofit and commercial enterprise as a 
consequence of organizational choices based on characteristics of organizations and arts 
forms as they currently exist.  The kinds of art that nonprofit cultural organizations exhib-
it or present, and the way they  present it, have co-evolved over time with their organizat-
ional forms, and therefore cannot be presumed to have caused the latter.  Second, the 
nonprofit legal form is to some extent an empty shell that can be employed for an almost 
unlimited range of noncommercial (and some commercial) purposes, depending on who 
has the motivation and capacity to use it.  Third, government plays a critical role in defin-
ing the scope of nonprofit activity by altering the incentives for entrepreneurs to use the 
nonprofit form.   Fourth, a significant predictor of the extent of nonprofit activity in spec-
ific cultural subfields is the capacity of those who stand to benefit from it to organize and 
to overcome free-rider problems.  Fifth, it follows from the first three points that we 
should not be surprised if the nonprofit sector’s cultural role changes markedly over time.    
Remaining Conundrums 
Each of the explanations reviewed here casts light on the role of nonprofit organizations 
in the intersectoral division of labor; and together they do better than each one does on its DiMaggio: Culture ---22--- 
own.   As with any kind of mystery, finding the right solution requires that we identify 
motive, opportunity, and means.  The market-failure approach goes far to solve the prob-
lem of motive; the industrial-organization view explains opportunity; and the historical-
political perspective helps us understand the means by which entrepreneurs succeeded in 
making nonprofits effective vehicles for the purposes they pursued.      
These theories account reasonably well for the intersectoral division of labor we 
observe today.   That division of labor has several striking features.   First, the relative 
importance of the nonprofit form varies less between artistic media (visual, musical, 
dramatic, literary) or organizational functions (exhibition, presentation) than within them.   
Most arts industries (broadly defined) have islands of nonprofit activity: scholarly and 
poetry presses, classical music presenters, art museums, resident theaters, and ballet or 
modern dance companies.   Nonprofit organizations are responsible for live presentation 
and exhibition of most of what has traditionally been regarded as “high culture.”   For-
profit concerns are dominant in the mechanical or digital distribution of all art forms, and 
in live presentations and exhibitions that appeal to large and educationally heterogeneous 
audiences.   For the most part, nonprofit sectors promote objectives – conserving a perm-
anent collection of great art, keeping many musicians on long-term contract, developing 
and educating a committed audience – that require relatively large investments and 
enough organizational stability to see them bear fruit.   By contrast, for-profit enterprise 
dominates those sectors that rely on technology to keep variable costs very low, and 
attempt to reach huge audiences through broadcasting and retail channels. 
With respect to the division of labor between public and nonprofit organizations, 
the data are roughly consistent with the public-choice story.   The few surveys that have DiMaggio: Culture ---23--- 
asked Americans about their willingness to spend tax dollars on particular kinds of cult-
ure suggest that most people support assistance to institutions that are perceived as serv-
ing a broad educational function (museums, libraries, arts programs in the schools) 
whereas fewer favor support for performing-arts groups or individual artists (DiMaggio 
and Pettit 1997).   Consistent with this, the public sector is best represented in the former 
areas.  Within the arts per se, between 70 and 75 percent of art museums are nonprofit, a 
proportion that has been stable for decades (Macro Systems 1979; Schuster 1999: Table 
3; Heilbrun and Gray 2001:187).  Moreover, approximately one in five nonprofit art mus-
eums, including some of the largest, like New York’s Metropolitan Museum or the Phila-
delphia Museum, are hybrids in which local government owns the buildings and grounds 
but nonprofit entities control collections and endowments (Schuster 1999: Tables 7, 8).  
Consistent with public-choice theory, public and hybrid art museums appear to be con-
centrated among generalist museums in large cities, whereas specialized museums and 
those in small places are predominantly nonprofits.
8 
Nonetheless, there are patterns for which our theories do not account, and which 
therefore represent areas of opportunity for research and theory development.   In high-
lighting these opportunities, I shall expand the range of variation beyond the kinds of org-
anizations that show up in the Census of Business, by examining data on embedded and 
minimalist organizations, and by looking more closely at industries that the Census 
assumes are entirely proprietary for signs of nonprofit life.
9   . 
Efficient boundaries.  A particular gap in research and theory on arts organizat-
ions has been the relative absence of work that addresses the issue of what economists 
call “efficient boundaries” – that is, the question of what activities fall within the bound-DiMaggio: Culture ---24--- 
aries of the firm, and which are either excluded or incorporated through contracting.   
Most theories take the structure and activities of firms as givens from which one can de-
duce which organizational form is most appropriate.   By contrast, I believe that we must 
endogenize organizational structure and activities if we are to understand the intersectoral 
division of labor.  This is the case in at least two ways. 
  First, we need to explain why some performing-arts activities are articulated by 
contract whereas others are internalized within single organizations.   As we have seen, 
when numerous activities – talent acquisition through long-term contracts, facilities 
management, and marketing – are internalized in a single firm, the nonprofit form is more 
likely to prevail.   But in many performing arts fields – from Hollywood movie product-
ion and Broadway theater to jazz clubs and rock concerts – artistic activities and manage-
ment are articulated through contract rather than hierarchy, an approach that economists 
sometimes refer to as “flexible specialization” (Storper 1989; Scott 2002).    
Jazz is the outstanding puzzle in this regard, for the genre has all the hallmarks of 
high culture – critical respect, a highly educated audience, representation in university 
music departments, eligibility for government and foundation grants – except a dominant 
role for  nonprofit organizations in its presentation (Peterson 1972; Lopes 2002).  Why 
are jazz quartets for-profit and chamber quartets nonprofit?   Jazz artists’ work is labor-
intensive, only a handful benefit from recording contracts and, consequentially technol-
ogical economies of scale; and only a few can cross-subsidize their artistic work with 
teaching appointments in universities (Heckathorn and Jeffri 2003).   Typically, jazz 
artists, like popular-music artists, enter into short-term performance contracts with 
proprietors of commercial nightclubs, drinking establishments, or concert halls.   DiMaggio: Culture ---25--- 
One explanation lies in the availability of grant support.  For organizations in art 
genres that gained a foothold in the system of philanthropic support when the window of 
opportunity was open (DiMaggio 1992), the nonprofit form is an effective way for man-
agers and artists to limit risk.  By contrast, in genres for which contributed funds are rare-
ly available, risk is handled by decoupling performance and presentation.   Most perform-
ance contracts in popular music protect the proprietor from long-term risk, transferring it 
instead to performers, who ordinarily work for a small fee and a percentage of the gate.  
(Broadway and much Off- and Off-Off Broadway theater employ a similar system, ex-
cept that the risk in the former is shared with investors rather than entirely assumed by 
the artists themselves.)   In effect, artists subsidize the artistic performance with proceeds 
from “day jobs” or family resources (Kreidler 1996; Alper and Wassall 2000). 
Another explanation may be related to the distribution of talent.  The founders of 
America’s orchestras (and the creators of nonprofit theaters who emulated them decades 
later) sought an alternative to short-term artists contracts because they believed (with 
good reason) that they could not achieve satisfactory levels of quality unless they, first, 
created long-term relationships among artists, who could achieve ensemble skills; and, 
second, long-term relationships with audiences, whom they could educate to appreciate 
the qualitative superiority they hoped to achieve.   Similarly, art museums (compared to 
earlier for-profit museums) eventually sought to create significant permanent collections, 
which in turn required long-term commitments to facilities.    
Given advances in performing-arts training and increases in the number of talent-
ed, committed artists, short-term contracting may have become a more efficient means of 
organizing, for presenters if not for artists.   Recording studios, for example, can contract DiMaggio: Culture ---26--- 
with studio musicians by the session because they have immensely skilled labor pools 
from whom to choose (Peterson and White 1979).   Similarly, members of small ensemb-
les in every musical genre subsidize production to keep quality high.   If this explanation 
is correct, then we might expect increases in the quality of performers (which may be in-
dexed by local measures of  artists’ population density) to be associated with more con-
tracting in fields like classical music and theater.  We might also find contracting more 
common when for-profit organizations can benefit parasitically from nonprofits’ invest-
ments (e.g., when small clubs or restaurants can contract with musicians who have 
learned to play together in a nonprofit orchestra or university jazz band).   
A second efficient-boundary issue has to do with the ways in which for-profit me-
dia companies’ choices provide opportunities for nonprofit entrepreneurs.  For-profit cul-
tural sectors, even the most concentrated and capital-intensive media industries, spawn 
oases of nonprofit activity.   Public television emerged out of the frustration of intellect-
uals and educators with the quality of commercial broadcasting.  Nonprofit poetry and 
fiction magazines respond to the difficulties that young writers face in finding an audi-
ence.   Most university presses publish works of scholarship (and in some cases, of fict-
ion or poetry) for audiences too small to justify production by commercial publishers.  
Nonprofit media arts centers and public and private universities present independent and 
foreign films (though their numbers and importance have diminished with the spread of 
pay cable movie channels and video and DVD rentals).   In many cases, efforts by public-
ly held media companies to slough off activities that, while profitable, produced poor 
margins, account for the role of the nonprofit sector in these fields.  (Public television 
emerged as a significant broadcast alternative only in the 1960s, after network executives DiMaggio: Culture ---27--- 
stopped worrying about intellectual respectability and abandoned earnest public-affairs 
and dramatic programming.)
10   A theory that focused exclusively on the nonprofit sector 
(as opposed to the broader ecology of media and cultural production) would be hard-
pressed to explain such developments. 
Is the cost disease curable?  The cost-disease hypothesis is consistent with the re-
sults of analyses of change over time in performing-arts institutions’ cost structures, for 
labor costs have indeed increased more quickly than other expenses, assuming an ever 
greater share of performing-arts budgets (Caves 2000; Heilbrun and Gray 2001).  Yet it is 
not clear that the cost-disease hypothesis explains this trend.  First, the nonprofit arts have 
expanded dramatically in the past thirty years.  Many organizational deficits reflect in-
creased fixed costs as a result of imprudent expansion (sometimes encouraged by donors 
or grantmakers) (McDaniel and Thorn 1991); and others reflect reduced market share due 
to greater competition.  Second, structural change in the U.S. economy -- a prolonged de-
cline in the manufacturing sector, where productivity growth through technological ad-
vance is easiest to achieve --- should have reduced the cost disease’s severity.   Third,  
where deficits do reflect higher wages, the cost disease is not always responsible: in some 
cases, as when orchestra salaries rose precipitously in response to large investments by 
the Ford Foundation during the 1970s, foundation grants and government subsidies 
cause, rather than respond to, such increases (Caves 2000: 254; Frey 1996).
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Fourth, performing-arts organizations have found ways to boost productivity: for-
profit theater producers produce lavish shows with several casts and send them out on the 
road to increase the ratio of variable to fixed costs (ibid.); nonprofit theaters mount play 
with smaller casts and less elaborate stage designs; studio ensembles (and even some live DiMaggio: Culture ---28--- 
pop performers) employ drum machines or replace string sections with synthesizers (Col-
onna et al. 1993).  That they can do this demonstrates the principle that cost structures in 
the arts reflect craft conventions -- shared ideas about what constitutes good practice -- 
more than technical necessities (Becker 1982).  Whatever we think of the aesthetic results 
of such devices, they represent economically viable means of fighting the cost disease.   
Embedded programs and organizations.  It is tempting to discount embedded org-
anizations as messy exceptions that can be ignored in efforts to explain the nonprofit role.  
But if, as I have argued, embedded arts organizations and programs are all around us --- 
in schools and universities, in churches, in community action agencies – then any theory 
of nonprofit origins must take them centrally into account.  None of our theories do. 
The publishing industry (newspapers, magazines, and books) illustrates this well.   
Most of the field’s nonprofits are embedded in other organizations, with the result that 
the nonprofit presence deviates from one would predict on the basis of theories of market 
failure or public choice.   The collective goods produced by newspapers are arguably as 
valuable as those produced, for example, by modern dance companies; and  many ob-
servers believe that greater diversity and competition in that industry would enhance 
democratic debate.  Yet all or almost all daily and weekly newspapers enumerated in the 
Census (2001c) are proprietary in form.  Like performing-arts organizations, newspapers 
are populated by professionals (journalists) with strong professional standards; and, also 
like performing-arts organizations, they cannot convince consumers to pay prices that 
would cover the costs of living up to those standards.   As Jencks (1986) observed, all 
this should make the newspaper industry ripe for the nonprofit presence it lacks.  DiMaggio: Culture ---29--- 
By contrast, there is a greater, albeit still small, nonprofit presence among period-
ical publishers, even though the greater diversity of perspective among national magaz-
ines and the relatively less daunting economics of the industry (compared to newspaper 
publishing) might lead us to expect very few.  One might anticipate that nonprofits would 
be found primarily among literary and poetry magazines, the least commercially viable 
subsector and one that promotes a valued social function.   Yet literary magazines are 
rarely tax-exempt (except when opportunities for government or foundation grants pro-
vide incentives): most of the U.S.’s roughly 500 poetry magazines are formally for-profit, 
mom-or-pop operations.
12   A few free-standing large-circulation periodicals devoted to 
serious debate or minority viewpoints --- e.g., Ms., Harper’s, the Nation  – are nonprofit, 
but they are not typical.   Most nonprofits that publish magazines do so to support such 
missions as running churches or trade unions, representing professional or industry 
groups (Museum News), or providing services to their members (Modern Maturity).   In 
other words, we have nonprofit magazines because larger nonprofit entities believe they 
can help them pursue their broader goals.  
The same is even more true of book publishers.  Because the trade publishing in-
dustry has experienced much recent consolidation (only two major proprietary U.S. trade 
publishers have escaped absorption by a handful of multinational media firms), many ob-
servers believe that the nonprofit subsector’s role has become even more important than 
it used to be (Miller 1997; Greco 2000).  The core of nonprofit book publishing includes 
just over one hundred university presses, which publish scholarly (and sometimes liter-
ary) works insufficiently commercial to interest large proprietary houses (Powell 1985).
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In addition, there are approximately two hundred other nonprofit presses, including a few DiMaggio: Culture ---30--- 
independent literary publishers and a larger number of embedded enterprises, such as the 
New England Science Fiction Association Press and Gospel Literature International.
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Once again, much of the nonprofit role in publishing reflects the embeddedness of book 
publishing in such other nonprofits as universities and voluntary associations.     
Embeddedness complicates our understanding and obscures our view of the field 
of performing-arts presentation in a different way.   Presenters, by which I refer to organ-
izations that specialize in booking acts into venues and selling tickets to the public (as op-
posed to organizations that employ artists on long-term contract),  have long occupied an 
important specialized role in the performing arts.  Early in the 20
th century, women’s and 
music clubs formed a local-presenters network that sponsored performances of touring 
orchestras throughout the United States.  By the 1920s, for-profit promoters like Arthur 
Judson’s Columbia Concert Management had learned to use such nonprofit associations 
so effectively that some contemporaries cried “monopoly” (Kirstein 1938: 50).    
  Significant contemporary presenters run a wide gamut from proprietary night 
clubs to municipal arenas to nonprofit performing-arts centers.  A large portion of the 
auditorium business is controlled by Clear Channel, a Texas-based entertainment con-
glomerate with large holdings in radio and outdoor advertising.   Many nonprofit organ-
izations are also in the presenting business: nonprofit performing-arts facilities, fairs and 
festivals, university-sponsored concert series, churches and theaters or orchestras that 
book outside acts into their own spaces when they are not using them (Hager and Pollak 
2002).  The public sector, almost always in the form of municipal government, also plays 
an active role, building, owning and sometimes managing performing sites (Strom 2001).   DiMaggio: Culture ---31--- 
Much of the for-profit sector’s role in music presentation is invisible because it is 
embedded in restaurants and bars, as well as in the nation’s more than 250 gambling casi-
nos (U.S. Census Bureau 2001(e).
15   Embeddedness also obscures the role of large pub-
lic and nonprofit universities, most of which present touring performing arts presentat-
ions, as do many smaller institutions.   Even less visible are the hundreds of churches and 
community associations that present performing-arts events and art exhibitions.  Even 
corporations have embedded arts programs:  About 400 have art collections, many of 
which are sometimes exhibited to the public (Martorella 1990); and corporate contracts 
sustain more than 300 firms that specialize in producing “industrials” (business-themed 
theatrical events for corporate management and sales meetings) (Bell 1987).   
Consideration of the role of the public sector in the arts is complicated by the 
importance of arts programs embedded in universities, many of them public, and further 
complicated by the fact that public and private universities are so similar things in their 
programs.  Although we ordinarily do not think of government as an important part of the 
U.S. music business, the public sector produces much classical music through state-
university orchestras (and much popular music as well, through high school, college, and 
military bands).  This state of affairs has more to do with institutionalized expectations of 
universities than with the kinds of factors to which economic theories call attention. 
The role of nonprofits in the arts education also looks different once embedded 
organizations are taken into account.  For example, 95 percent of 5637 dance schools 
reported in the Census of Business (Table 1) are proprietary.   But the Census fails to 
measure dance instruction provided in colleges and universities.  Women’s colleges were 
the first U.S. institutions to treat the dance as a respectable activity, albeit often as part of DiMaggio: Culture ---32--- 
their physical education programs (Kendall 1979), and many institutions of higher edu-
cation remain involved in dance training.   
I am aware of no research that attempts to explain systematically the kinds of 
artistic programs that non-arts entities choose to organize and incorporate, or to analyze 
the economics of embedded nonprofits.   Many of the cases reviewed here share one of 
two things: cross-subsidization of marketing and facilities expenses for arts activities out 
of fixed costs of the sponsoring institutions (for example, in churches, cocktail lounges, 
or universities); or opportunities to subsidize fixed costs from grants in support of arts 
programs (e.g., in community agencies and other nonprofits that depend on soft money).  
In addition, some arts programming appears to be expected of certain kinds of organizat-
ions (e.g., church choirs or university theaters), or else to serve as a market signal for 
unobservable qualities (e.g., the fad for gamelon orchestras in elite liberal-arts colleges).   
  Issues related to size, capital intensity, and fixed costs.  Existing theories do not 
account for what appears to be a ￿-shaped relationship between capital-intensiveness and 
form.   As noted earlier, the cultural producers with the greatest fixed costs --- television 
networks, book publishers, record companies, and so on --- are predominantly for-profit, 
relying on economies of scale and scope to produce profits.   Within those arts fields that 
are predominantly nonprofit, however,  this relationship is reversed, and the nonprofit 
form is more commonly used by organizations that have relatively high fixed costs: for 
example, performing-arts organizations that combine presentation and performance 
(especially those that own facilities) and museums, which must keep up facilities and 
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quartets, Off-Off-Broadway theater companies) are less likely to incorporate as 501(c)3s, 
even when their missions are consistent with nonprofit status.   
Many “minimalist” organizations never make it into the official statistics.  In 
classical music, volunteer-run, intermittently performing, community orchestras and am-
ateur chamber groups are ubiquitous, and only the more organized have acquired 501(c)3 
status.  Unincorporated chamber ensembles outnumber chamber groups that are incorp-
orated as nonprofits or that operate as formal subunits of symphony orchestra or of univ-
ersity or conservatory music programs [King 1980].  In all fields, much performing is 
done by individual artists (unincorporated sole proprietorships, as it were).   
Unincorporated associations are also active elsewhere in the performing arts.  The 
UDAO lists more than 5000 theater groups and 3500 dance groups not counted by the 
Census.  Although it classifies them as “nonprofit,” one suspects that relatively few have 
their own tax-exemptions.  Approximately 2000 are amateur community groups, and 
more than 1000 are college or university ensembles.  Most craft artists, painters and 
sculptors are solo practitioners operating directly in the marketplace rather than creating 
artworks as employees of organizations (Jeffri and Greenblatt 1994).   Many hold “day 
jobs” in schools, art centers, or other nonprofit or public institutions that provide both a 
living wage and access to studio space.   (At the opposite extreme,  representational artist 
Thomas Kinkade formed a corporation,  the Media Arts Group, which owns or franchises 
a national chain of Thomas Kinkade Signature Galleries and is traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange [Orlean 2001]; and pop singer David Bowie incorporated himself  to sell 
“Bowie Bonds” secured against his future royalties [Steyn 1997].)   Finally, although no 
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establishments (not to mention public airports and nonprofit schools and hospitals) main-
tain small exhibition spaces that, in the aggregate, serve numerous patrons.   
Our theories of nonprofit organization make little room for the populous smallest 
tail of the size distribution, where individuals shade into informal clubs and associations, 
and informal groups occasionally become formal organizations.   Yet such entities, like 
larger and more visible firms, make (or avoid) choices about organizational form.  And, 
together, they embody many values and pursue many missions associated with the 
nonprofit cultural sector as a whole.   
Questions about the public/private division of labor.  Public-choice models focus 
upon goods for which demand rises over time, and posit a dynamic in which government 
and nonprofits cede some of their role to commercial substitutes as incomes rise.  Yet if 
one discounts activities embedded in public schools and universities, there are few 
cultural sectors in which government and commercial firms co-exist: perhaps only broad-
casting (where nonprofits and public stations constitute the public broadcasting system);  
museums (where commercial entities are a small and poorly understood minority); and 
performing-arts presentation.  Public enterprises are surprisingly absent from cultural 
sectors that are predominantly for-profit.  In virtually all such fields, nonprofit 
organizations constitute the noncommercial minority.
16   The reasons for this pattern are 
not well understood. 
The respective roles of public and nonprofit sectors in community cultural 
leadership warrant further study.   In 2000 there were approximately 4000 local arts 
agencies, of which 1200 had paid professional staff.  Formerly called “arts councils,” 
local arts agencies present arts events, sponsor arts-educational programs, make grants, DiMaggio: Culture ---35--- 
manage facilities, provide services to artists, and engage in community cultural planning.  
The public sector is dominant in cities with populations greater than 500,000, whereas the 
75 percent of local arts agencies that are private nonprofits prevail in smaller places 
(Davidson 2001).   It is not clear that public-choice theory would predict this pattern, 
which probably reflects the fact that the roles available to local arts agencies in large 
cities entail greater responsibility for tax dollars.
17 
Dynamic predictions of public-choice theories would seem to receive mixed sup-
port.  Rising educational levels should increase government spending on the arts as de-
mand from the median voter rises.  This was the case in the United States (especially if 
one views the charitable deduction as a tax subsidy [Feld et al. 1983]), yet the opposite 
occurred in Europe, which experienced a trend towards greater nonprofit (as opposed to 
government) activity since the 1980s (Kawashima 1999). Whether increasing religious 
and ethnic heterogeneity in much of Europe can explain this trend or whether it repre-
sents a failure of public-choice theory is a question that research has yet to answer.   
Hybrids and network organizations.  We also lack powerful theories about the in-
creasingly important phenomena of hybrid organizations, which contain elements of at 
least two organizational forms; and projects that are accomplished less by individual en-
tities than by networks of organizations in different sectors.   I have already referred to 
the large minority of important art museums in which governance is divided between the 
public sector, which controls the physical plant, and a nonprofit organization that controls 
collections and endowment.  Still other private museums guarantee by charter that public 
officials are represented on their governing boards.  Schuster (1999) contends that the 
proportion of all museums that are hybrids grew during the last quarter of the 20
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ury.  One can find similar arrangements in the performing arts (e.g., Washington D.C.’s 
Lincoln Theater, with its building owned and maintained by local government and artistic 
programming carried out by a nonprofit organization).  
Artistic work is also carried out through partnerships that involve participants 
from all three sectors.  The creation of large urban performing-arts centers typically 
involves government legislative sponsorship and fiscal stimulus, private investment, and 
participation by the nonprofit arts organizations that occupy the structures; and their 
management often involves public/private collaboration as well (Strom 2001).    
Whereas such centers are among the largest arts entities, partnerships between 
nonprofit and for-profit entities are visible at the other end of the size distribution as well.  
A study of arts activities in ten low-income Chicago neighborhoods noted that much art-
istic vitality stemmed from interactions among networks of small groups, some for-profit, 
a few nonprofit, and many unincorporated or informal.  One racially integrated neighbor-
hood of 65,000 residents boasted 35 arts entities, many of them clustered within a radius 
of just a few blocks.  A hub of this activity was a proprietary restaurant and bar that in-
cluded a small book store, and a stage and exhibition space, which were available to local 
artists and performers.   When this kind of network is successful, it may have substantial 
advantages over conventional nonprofit firms: the ability to engage readily participants 
from many types of organization; low capital costs due to an infrastructure based on rec-
iprocity rather than hierarchy; resilience in the face of staff turnover; and the robustness 
of a loosely coupled system of autonomous but interdependent parts (Grams and Warr 
2002; and for similar conclusions from a study in a different city, Stern and Seifert DiMaggio: Culture ---37--- 
2000a; for a discussion of similar dynamics in the social service field, see Milofsky 1987; 
and in biotechnology and related fields, Powell 2001). 
Broadcasting: A three-sector industry.  A few fields present special opportunities 
for comparative research because of the co-existence of multiple sectors within them.  Of 
these, none is more intriguing than broadcasting, which is characterized by enormous 
diversity in organizational form, including network vs. independent, and embedded vs. 
freestanding.  At the end of 2001, noncommercial entities controlled approximately one 
sixth of U.S. radio stations, and just over one in five full-signal television stations  (Reed 
Business Information 2003: xxxii).  Noncommercial radio stations were underrepresented 
among those with the strongest signals; nonprofit television broadcasters constituted a 
larger share of UHF than of VHF outlets.  Most nonprofit television stations and just 
under one in three noncommercial radio stations are affiliated with the Public Broad-
casting System (a public/private hybrid).  In addition, the nonprofit broadcasting sector 
includes independent and Christian nonprofit stations (though many other Christian 
stations are proprietary), as well as numerous college, university and secondary-school 
stations(Reed Business Information 2003: B-134, D-545).    
Radio is particularly intriguing because the noncommercial and proprietary sect-
ors occupy distinct niches defined by well-defined programming formats.   Noncommer-
cial stations dominate classical music and jazz formats, as well as the “alternative” and 
“progressive” rock formats favored by many college radio station managers.   They also 
constitute the majority of stations with diversified formats, and almost all those that 
describe themselves as “educational.”   Commercial broadcasters, by contrast, rule main-DiMaggio: Culture ---38--- 
stream pop radio, with well over 90 percent of stations in the adult contemporary, 
country, oldies, classic rock, and middle-of-the-road formats (Ibid.). 
Noncommercial and for-profit stations share some format niches.  Nonprofits are 
prominent among religious broadcasters, comprising nearly 50 percent of “Christian,” 
“religious,” and “inspirational” stations (but just over 10 percent of stations offering 
“Gospel” programming).  Noncommercial broadcasters also represent a large minority of 
stations with youth-oriented and African-American formats (approximately 30 percent 
and almost 20 percent respectively).  In some cases the nonprofit/commercial divide is 
marked by relatively small differences in self-description: more than half of “news” stat-
ions are nonprofit, but almost 90 percent of stations boasting “news-talk” or “talk” form-
ats are for-profit (Ibid.: D661-62).   
Does Organizational Form Make a Difference? 
As readers of this Handbook are aware, students of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, 
nursing homes, and daycare facilities have conducted many comparative studies of the 
behavioral differences that flow from organizational form.   Students of cultural 
organizations have done little of this.   
In part, this is because there are few cases in which nonprofit and for-profit entit-
ies are similar enough in form and function to make statistical comparison sensible.  How 
would one compare a nonprofit resident theater that maintains a facility, mounts several 
productions per year, books in jazz concerts and dance performances, and provides serv-
ices to its community’s schools to a Broadway production company whose only purpose 
is to produce one show as skillfully as possible until the end of its run?   Is the appropr-
iate comparison group for nonprofit art museums the relatively few small proprietary DiMaggio: Culture ---39--- 
museums, or the broader category of theme parks?   What is the for-profit counterpart of 
the poets’ collective, the arts-in-education program at a local community center, or a 
neighborhood mural project? 
To be sure, there are select populations where fruitful behavioral comparisons 
could be made: between municipal and private museums, or public and nonprofit local 
arts agencies; for-profit art galleries and artists’ cooperatives; or between nonprofit and 
for-profit literary presses, music schools, Christian radio stations, and circuses.  If there 
are empirical studies of any of these topics but the first, I am unaware of them. 
Without empirical guidance from systematic comparative research, students of 
nonprofit arts organizations must rely on case studies and theory.  There are three basic 
kinds of theory, one (primarily produced by economists, who value abstraction and par-
simony) positing that behavioral differences flow from differences in the ordered prefer-
ences (“objective functions”) of decision-makers in nonprofit and for-profit firms; a sec-
ond that attributes behavioral differences to structural differences that influence decision-
making at the organizational level;  and a third that views behavioral differences as con-
tingent upon the particular niches that for-profit and nonprofit cultural producers occupy 
in particular fields.  
  Preference-centered explanations.   Economics explains phenomena by aggreg-
ating upward from the more-or-less rational behavior of individuals who pursue their 
interests as they define them.   Because people with varying preferences for different out-
comes will behave in ways calculated to maximize their “objective functions,” organizat-
ions run by such people will exhibit behavioral differences accordingly.  The preferences 
of for-profit cultural producers are clear enough: They want to maximize profits.
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contrast, the objective functions of nonprofit decision-makers are more varied.  Econom-
ists ordinarily make stylized assumptions about what the nonprofit arts manager wants in 
lieu of maximizing net revenue.   The two most popular assumptions are that nonprofit 
arts managers seek to maximize artistic excellence (if they share the values of artists) or 
audience size (if they want as many people as possible to receive the benefits of the work 
they produce).   Some observers suggest that nonprofit managers may also want to 
maximize growth (in order to enhance their power, their salaries or both) (Hansmann 
1981; Throsby and Withers 1979; Heilbrun and Gray 2001).  
  These assumptions are reasonable, especially when they are applied to convent-
ional performing-arts organizations or museums.   Because most arts managers make rel-
atively low salaries and are prohibited from sharing in net revenues to stakeholders, the 
field is unlikely to attract managers who place financial outcomes first.   Moreover, peop-
le who choose to work with artists, often in what is perceived to be a support role, are 
likely to sympathize with artists’ perspectives and values.  And managers who believe in 
what they are doing are likely to want to share the product with a large public.    
Alas, there is little empirical support for these assumptions, however.   Several 
ingenious studies have sought to reveal arts organizations’ objective functions by seeing 
what such organizations do more of when their discretionary revenues increase: results 
vary sharply from sample to sample (Luksetich and Lange 1995).  Case studies of actual 
arts organizations, which, however atypical they may be, represent the bulk of the 
evidence available to us, are equally inconclusive.   
To be sure, key decision makers in many arts nonprofits are committed to artistic 
excellence as they perceive it.   Small performing groups that operate de jure or de facto DiMaggio: Culture ---41--- 
as cooperatives are often quality-maximizers (especially when members have viable day 
jobs) (Murnighan 1991).  But even where quality maximization is the goal, it is an impre-
cise guide to behavior because there are so many dimensions to, and definitions of, “art-
istic quality:” craft skill, daring or disturbing content, innovative production technique, 
virtuoso performances and seamless ensemble work.   Moreover, many small for-profit 
arts producers (e.g., independent recording companies and poetry presses) seem equally 
artist-identified and committed to artistic values.    
  Similarly, the meaning of commitment to audience development varies markedly 
from manager to manager.   Conservative arts institutions may prefer their audiences 
small and socially exclusive, if trustees and patrons value intimacy and social comfort.  
Arian [1971] contended that the Philadelphia Orchestra pursued this  policy in the 1960s, 
and they were certainly not alone.   Budgetary expansion, often associated with capital 
investments that raise fixed costs, has made even some of the staidest institutions, espec-
ially museums, seek larger audiences.  Even so, nonprofit cultural organizations’ pursuit 
of larger audiences is almost always constrained by ideas about appropriate repertoire or 
exhibition content or by considerations of organizational prestige (Ostrower 2002).    
Some arts-organization decision-makers appear more interested in audience qual-
ity, often defined as audience commitment to value of artistic risk-taking and willingness 
to be challenged, than in audience quantity.   Even managers who want to increase audi-
ence size rarely act as if they are deeply committed to audience diversity:  In the 1890s, 
the managers of the Chicago Symphony failed to advertise concerts in the German-lang-
uage press (which reached what would have been the largest market for symphonic mus-
ic).  In the 1990s, performing-arts managers sought foundation grants to attract more eth-DiMaggio: Culture ---42--- 
nically diverse audiences only to abandon their efforts when the grants expired.   Overall, 
the notion that arts managers are interested in reaching out to new publics (as opposed to 
using standardized marketing techniques to clone the audiences they already have) re-
ceives little empirical support.
19  Moreover, the assertion that audience expansion is an 
important objective of cultural organizations is belied by the low status of education and 
outreach programs in most established art museums and performing-arts organizations 
(Eisner and Dobbs 1986; National Task Force for the American Orchestra 1993).   In-
deed, one study of art museums found that, controlling for exhibition space, collection 
budgets, and city characteristics, nonprofit museums drew significantly fewer visitors 
than their public counterparts (Oster and Goetzmann 2002: 17). 
The notion that nonprofit arts organizations seek growth has received much anec-
dotal support.  The fact that arts managers cannot distribute profits does not mean that 
financial objectives do not guide their behavior.  Many arts managers are deficit optimiz-
ers rather than profit maximizers.  That is, they seek the deficit that will maximize the 
sum of earned and contributed revenues by inducing additional contributions at the mar-
gin.  Growth is attractive to arts institutions and their managers for many reasons.   Most 
mundanely, given the high correlation between budget size and managerial salaries in 
nonprofit arts firms (Hallock 2002:395), budgetary expansion is the best strategy a 
manager can employ to boost her or his income and prestige.   
Expansion can also be a means to other ends.  In the 1930s, the Brooklyn Muse-
um’s Director sought to open a chain of branch museums across Long Island as a means 
of using his collection more efficiently to reach a larger public; and in recent years, New 
York’s Guggenheim Museum created a worldwide chain of Guggenheim-branded muse-DiMaggio: Culture ---43--- 
ums (with dire financial consequences) for the same purpose (DiMaggio 1991c).  Finally, 
growth is, to some extent, a strongly institutionalized cultural value: An anthropologist 
who studied arts organizations in a small Pennsylvania city reported that growth was a 
pervasive concern for managers, trustees and donors, because they regarded it as a sign of 
“vitality and good management” (Cameron 1991:232).   
Behind the notion of an organizational or managerial objective function lies much 
ambiguity about whose objectives count.   Ultimately, trustees have the authority to set 
organizational goals   Attempting to model the objective functions of large nonprofit arts 
organizations without reference to patrons and trustees is futile, not just because of their 
legal authority but because, compared to wealthy patrons in other fields, those in the arts 
are more specialized in their philanthropy, make larger gifts, are more personally in-
volved with the organizations they support, and are more likely to be affiliated with up-
per-class social institutions (Ostrower 1995: 92-95).   Nonetheless, in many arts organiz-
ations, especially smaller ones, managers or artistic directors exert great influence over 
their boards.   In some organizations (ordinarily large ones that depend on earned income 
for most of their revenues), artists are subordinate to managers.  In others (ordinarily 
small ones that subsist on grants and contributed labor), artists may dominate managers.  
And for some purposes the objectives of grantmakers may be as consequential as those of 
museum decision-makers themselves (Alexander 1996).  
  Organization-centered explanations.   Such heterogeneity is at the center of org-
anization-centered explanations.   In this view, differences between nonprofit and for-
profit arts firms reflect not arts managers’ preferences, but rather decision-making proc-
esses peculiar to nonprofit (and public) enterprise.  Whereas preference-based models DiMaggio: Culture ---44--- 
may be more illuminating for small, artist-led nonprofits than for large and complex ones, 
the opposite is true of organization-centered explanations, which start from the premise 
that decisions represent the interaction of conflicting and incommensurable agendas rath-
er than the objective function of any single actor. 
  In this view, the major difference between for-profit and nonprofit firms is that, 
whereas the former has one legitimate goal (profit maximization) to which all participants 
must at least publicly subscribe, nonprofit firms are intrinsically multiple-objective, mult-
iple-stakeholder organizations (Blaug 2001: 127; Tschirhart 1996).  The encyclopedic ur-
ban art museum is the outstanding example, as much a confederation of professional de-
partments, each with its own distinctive objective function, as a single organization (Di-
Maggio 1991b; for a similar view of theaters, see Voss et al. 2000).  Curators focus on 
collecting and exhibiting objects, which they value for their own sake; exhibition special-
ists and educators emphasize the quality of the museum experience; marketing managers 
care about numbers; development specialists about cultivating donors; government-af-
fairs directors about demonstrating enough public-spiritedness to justify subsidy (Zolberg 
1981).  The director (depending on background and inclinations) seeks some balance 
among all these objectives, perhaps while working actively to snare the next big exhibit-
ion, while readying plans for a new wing.   The board of trustees, which is supposed to 
adjudicate among these agendas, consists of men and women with agendas of their own.   
No wonder two perceptive observers remarked that the major job of the art museum dir-
ector is to conceal the museum’s true objective function (Frey and Pommerehene, 1980).    
  In some ways, large cultural nonprofits are more like political coalitions -- groups 
of stakeholders with diverse objectives who find potential value in cooperation -- than DiMaggio: Culture ---45--- 
they are like bureaucracies.  Heterogeneity of objectives produces not characteristic de-
cisions (these will vary from coalition to coalition), but characteristic organizational cult-
ures and management styles.  These include ambiguous goals, flexible rule systems with 
many exceptions, and a pervasive sense that decision-making is a “political” rather than a 
purely rational activity (March 1962; Tschirhart 1996).  Decision-making itself is likely 
to be episodic: Unable to articulate a clear objective function without alienating critical 
constituencies, managers will lurch from objective to objective one at a time, often re-
sponding to crises rather than initiating strategies in advance.
20   Planning will focus on 
facilities and programming: strategic planning will be largely symbolic.   Elements of this 
description apply to many for-profits, as well.   But in large cultural nonprofits, goal am-
biguity is not a problem to be solved: it is a fundamental condition of organizational life. 
  Other differences between nonprofit and proprietary work settings flow from or-
ganizational features peculiar to particular industries.   In the classical field, for example, 
commercial music jobs pay better, are less interesting musically, and require more extra-
ordinary feats of sight-reading (to economize on studio or rehearsal time).   By contrast, 
small-ensemble nonprofit settings provide poorer wages, more interesting music, and re-
quire more tonal creativity and emotional range (Allen 1998). 
  Environmental contingency models.   By contingency models, I refer to models 
that view nonprofit/for-profit behavioral differences as contextually variable, depending 
upon the relative positions of nonprofit and for-profit firms in a given industry (for ex-
amples from other industries, see Weisbrod 1990) and in their local communities.   Such 
models represent the application of such theoretical approaches from sociology and 
organization science as resource-dependence theory, neoinstitutional theory, and DiMaggio: Culture ---46--- 
organizational ecology.   Common to all of them is the view that to predict differences in 
the behavior of nonprofits and for-profits in a given field, we must understand both the 
field’s competitive dynamics (including the niches that for-profits and nonprofits occupy) 
and the network of cooperative relationships in which nonprofits are enmeshed.  Decision 
makers’ preferences matter in this view.  But those preferences can be predicted if one 
knows the environment the organization faces, because organizations recruit managers 
whose preferences are suited to the environments in which they must operate.   
  Although most nonprofit arts organizations give lip service to the value of cooper-
ation, they are in fact subject to intense competitive pressures.   A study from the mid- 
1990s found that almost one in seven arts organizations became inactive within five years 
(Hager 2001; also Bowen et al. 1994).   Such failure rates indicate that selection pressures 
constrain the ability of trustees or managers to pursue objectives for which resources 
(market demand, grants or donations, contributed services) are unavailable, thus limiting 
the utility of models of nonprofit behavior based on assumptions about manager or trust-
ee objective functions. 
As we have seen, in relatively few fields do nonprofit arts organizations compete 
directly with similar for-profit firms.   In most places, if one wants to visit a large art 
exhibit, one goes to a nonprofit (or public) museum; and if one buys a subscription to a 
series of performing-arts events, it will probably be from a nonprofit organization as well.   
Within these fields, the behavior of a particular nonprofit will vary with the extent to 
which it holds a local  monopoly.  Where there are several nonprofit theaters, orchestras, 
art museums or public radio stations, one is often the “generalist” (Hannan and Freeman 
1989) --- a full-service provider with a much larger budget than the rest, offering a DiMaggio: Culture ---47--- 
diverse set of programs to a broad range of publics, with special attention to middle-class 
members or subscribers and wealthy patrons --- and the others ordinarily specialize in 
particular kinds of artistic work (often with artists or curators playing more important 
decision-making roles than in larger institutions) (DiMaggio and Stenberg 1985b).    
In a long-term study of nonprofit organizations in the Twin Cities, Galaskiewicz 
(1997) reported that more competition among nonprofits in a particular field led to 
greater inequality, with the largest organizations increasing both earned and contributed 
income and the smallest forced to specialize and innovate in order to survive.  By con-
trast, in remote places with relatively little commercial entertainment,  the ecological per-
spective predicts that nonprofit arts presenters will offer repertoires that are decidedly 
more middlebrow than in communities with active for-profit commercial venues. 
  When arts nonprofits do compete directly with for-profit counterparts, nonprofits 
may attempt to differentiate their services as higher quality, whereas for-profits will com-
pete on price and convenience (a pattern one observes in competition for young music 
students among for-profit music schools and nonprofit conservatories).   Where compet-
ition is between community-based nonprofits and for-profit entities with fewer commun-
ity ties (e.g., between nonprofit theaters and traveling commercial shows oriented to Af-
rican-American audiences, or between Hispanic-oriented commercial broadcasters and 
local nonprofits with Spanish-language programming), nonprofits are more likely to 
compete by emphasizing collective identity, political awareness, and special local 
services.   Some community based for-profits --- e.g., local bookstores competing with 
chains or local nightclubs --- also multiply services (e.g., respectively, presenting DiMaggio: Culture ---48--- 
readings by local authors, or permitting local performing groups to use their stage for 
rehearsal) in order to underscore their community ties.   
  Endemic expansion and institutionalization have increased the intensity of com-
petition among nonprofit arts organizations (and between them and for-profit substitutes) 
for the consumer dollar (McDaniel and Thorn 1981).  In particular, many art museums 
have expanded their scope of operations (and with it, their fixed costs) to the point that 
traditional sources of public and private patronage must be supplemented by additional 
forms of earned income, a development that has pushed most of the largest museums to-
wards special exhibitions and retailing (Rudenstine 1991; Anheier and Toepfler 1998; Al-
exander 1996).   Expansion has also increased commercial demands on performing-arts 
organizations, the reliance of which on the subscription system has exerted a conservative 
influence on repertoire (DiMaggio and Stenberg 1985a; Hager 2001: 387; Heilbrun 2001; 
O’Hagan and Neligan 2002).   Under these circumstances, the openness of a field to art-
istic innovation depends on keeping entry barriers low, so that creatively fertile if short-
lived small, experimental organizations can operating at the field’s artistic cutting edge. 
The behavior of nonprofit arts organizations is a function not simply of their com-
petitive environment, but also of the network of cooperative relations in which they are 
enmeshed (Gramms and Warr 2002; Backer 2002).   Arts nonprofits engage in a wide 
range of exchanges with other actors (both organizations and individuals); and much of 
their behavior can be explained analytically as an effort to maintain the commitment of 
actors on whom they depend (Galaskiewicz 1985; Stern and Seifert 2000a).   Many small 
nonprofits, for example, survive by inducing artists to participate at below-market wages; 
in exchange for foregone income, such arts groups are likely to offer some combination DiMaggio: Culture ---49--- 
of artistic voice (either directly, through participatory decision-making or by proxy 
through the dominance of an artistic leader whose vision participants respect),  
professional training, and access to valuable social networks. 
            The behavior of “embedded” nonprofits reflects the demands of the organizations 
that sponsor them.   University-based performing-arts institutions ordinarily devote more 
time to training young musicians than other ensembles.  College  art museums devote 
more space to educational programs than do their public or freestanding nonprofit count-
erparts, but have fewer visitors per square foot of exhibition space (Oster and Goetzmann 
2002: 7, 9).   Community organizations’ arts programs tend to reflect their sponsor’s pol-
itical orientation and social ethos, just as church-based arts programs may mirror the re-
ligious faith and communal orientation of the denominations that sponsor them.  
  Even free-standing nonprofit organizations are influenced by the network of relat-
ionships that sustain them.   Where these relationships are formal (for example, when arts 
groups share a common performance facility [Freedman 1986], or participate in a united 
arts fund-raising campaign [Shanahan 1989]) such ties can be highly constraining.   Some 
collaborative relations, such as partnerships between nonprofit resident theaters who de-
velop new plays and Broadway producers who commercialize them, induce nonprofits to 
behave more like commercial entities.  Other relationships, such as the positive impact of 
the expansion of university music programs on the number of new composers entering 
U.S. orchestra repertoires, stimulate artistic risk-taking by reducing its cost (Dowd 2002).    
The same is true at the community level.  Informal relations among trustees may 
also influence the opportunities available to nonprofit arts organizations as well as the 
constraints they face.  Trustees of major arts nonprofits are more likely than those of DiMaggio: Culture ---50--- 
other types to be involved in business associations that promote local economic devel-
opment (Whitt and Lammers 1991).  These ties may enhance the likelihood that such 
organizations cooperate with development plans and be included in them.       
*     *     * 
No generalization can characterize the objective function of nonprofit arts firms in a way 
that enables us to predict their behavior (either as a group or in contrast to a stylized for-
profit competitor), for three reasons.  First, arts organizations’ missions (and the objective 
functions of decision makers they recruit to accomplish these missions) reflect the niches 
they occupy in a broader community cultural ecology.   Those niches vary over time, 
across communities, and among different arts fields.   Second, the very notion that the 
large, complex nonprofit arts organization has a consistent objective function is itself 
problematic.  Such institutions are sites at which trustees, managers, and professional 
staff with distinct and often inconsistent objective functions struggle under ambiguous 
terms of engagement with results that resemble temporary truces more closely than 
sustained strategies.   Third, in some cases, arts organizations’ behavior reflects other 
people’s objective functions – the churches or universities or community groups that 
sponsor them, the managers of performing-arts centers upon which they depend for 
performance space, foundation program officers, or local legislators upon whom they rely 
for grants or subsidy, or the network of collaborating artists and organizations in which 
they participate.  Under these circumstances, the best we can do is point to general 
principles or mechanisms that will help us to analyze particular cases, based upon 
patterns that emerge out of comparative analyses.    
The Changing Nonprofit Cultural Sector DiMaggio: Culture ---51--- 
The role of nonprofit organizations in the arts has evolved steadily since the creation of 
America’s first nonprofit art museums and orchestras in the 19
th century.   For the most 
part, the story has been one of expanding functions, resulting from two different pro-
cesses.   On the one hand, the orchestra and museum model of trustee governance, donat-
ive support, and commitment to artistic values spread gradually to other art forms – op-
era, theater, the dance, and jazz.   On the other, since the 1960s other kinds of nonprofits 
– community organizations, human-service agencies, universities, churches – have 
spawned arts programs, creating a separate nonprofit arts sector committed to different 
roles for the arts and based on somewhat different organizational principals.    
Barring long-term economic recession that undercuts opportunities for contributed 
income, or legislative action that makes the nonprofit form less attractive, we can expect 
to see the nonprofit sector bear the principle responsibility for live performance and ex-
hibition of an expanding range of art forms and genres, and for programs that use the arts 
to pursue social-welfare agendas, while gradually extending into new niches that are 
opened by industrial concentration and technological change. 
Economic and Demographic Factors 
The enormous boom in the nonprofit arts during the final third of the 20
th century, and 
especially in the creation of nonprofit museums and performing-arts institutions in large 
and mid-sized cities around the United States, has arguably led to, if not oversupply, at 
least the satiation of demand.   The forces that fueled that expansion --- the coming to age 
of the baby-boom generation, the simultaneous state-financed expansion of higher edu-
cation, and the rapid rise in government arts funding --- are spent.   Although new enter-
prises will enter the picture as old ones fail, nonprofit theater, museums, orchestras, and DiMaggio: Culture ---52--- 
opera and dance constitute mature industries with relatively little potential for continuing 
growth and some risk of attrition in the middle ranks (Wolf Organization 1992). 
  Much growth in the nonprofit arts was facilitated by low wages due to the over-
production of artists during the 1970s and 1980s, a period during which the number of 
artists in the labor force increased rapidly as their median earnings markedly declined 
(Kreidler 1996).   Because most arts fields have what economist Robert Frank (Frank and 
Cook 1995; Rosen 1981) calls “winner-take-all” labor markets --- career tracks where a 
few people reap extraordinary rewards while most others, including men and women of 
great talent, receive meager if any returns -- graduates of arts programs have constituted a 
reserve army of the underemployed upon which many nonprofits (as well as for-profit ad 
agencies, interior design firms, and proprietary schools [Stern 2000]) have depended for 
workers and management alike.  In the 1990s, the rate of increase in the artistic labor 
force began to slow, falling slightly behind the growth rate for professional occupations 
as a whole (Cultural Policy and the Arts Data Archive 2003).  If the decline continues, an 
important foundation of the nonprofit arts economy may be placed in jeopardy. 
  By contrast, the new immigration will engender a boom in arts organizations de-
voted to the cultures and ambitions of newcomers from Latin America and Asia.  Stud-
ents of voluntary organizations in comparative cross-national perspective have long noted 
a positive association between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the size of nonprofit 
sectors (Weisbrod 1997; James 1987).  Whether demand for immigrant culture is ab-
sorbed by for-profit entrepreneurs or whether immigrant arts becomes a nonprofit growth 
area during the first decades of the 21
st century remains to be seen.  To some extent it will 
depend on such imponderables as the rate of assimilation of new immigrants into the pan-DiMaggio: Culture ---53--- 
ethnic middle class, the demand of immigrants for arts programs that emphasize fine 
points of shared culture and identity as opposed to those that market efficiently a mass-
oriented version of indigenous art forms; and the fit between the U.S. nonprofit form and 
modes of organizing artistic activity prevalent in immigrant artists’ countries of origin.   
The rise of Evangelical Christianity poses an analogous opportunity and challenge 
to the nonprofit arts sector.  Conservative Christians have increased their share of the 
U.S. population substantially over the past four decades and, at the same time, have 
become more similar to other Americans in educational attainment, income, and regional 
distribution (Hout et al. 2001).   Some Christian entrepreneurs have created new forms of 
identity-based, for-profit enterprise that elicit commitment, including donations of time or 
money, from customers based on shared identity or faith.   The most notable examples at 
present are broadcast enterprises owned by Evangelical Christians who portray their 
business interests as incidental to their mission to spread the gospel.   Like immigrant-
based enterprises that produce collective goods without benefit of nonprofit charter, the 
key mechanism is the use of shared faith or identity as a substitute for the trust inspired 
by the non-distribution constraint.  Eventually such entrepreneurs may gravitate to the 
nonprofit form; or they may present a challenge to it.   
Ultimately the challenges posed by demographic change will lead nonprofit arts 
organizations to search for new “efficient boundaries” to define their missions and activ-
ities.  The key question is: What functions fit within the framework of the nonprofit arts 
firm (or of the larger nonprofit entity in which arts activities are embedded), and which 
ones will stay outside it?  Galaskiewicz (1997) has pointed to the versatility of hospitals 
at bundling additional functions and services, while preserving their core missions.  Since DiMaggio: Culture ---54--- 
the 1970s many arts large arts nonprofits have likewise bundled new services 
(educational programs, community outreach, performing-arts presenting, food services, 
retail operations) into their portfolio (Throsby and Withers 1979: 48).   Whether con-
ventional arts nonprofits – theater companies, art museums, symphony orchestras, and so 
on – become arts mega-enterprises or leave new markets and missions to more agile 
competitors remains to be seen.   At the same time, we may see new combinations of en-
terprise – e.g., artists cooperatives that branch into rights management or distribution of 
digital images or cultural centers devoted to particular immigrant cultures that begin to 
present artists from other national-origin groups --- occupy important roles.  
The Eroding Boundary between High and Popular Culture and the Nonprofit Arts 
Sector’s Broadening Scope 
The last half century has witnessed dramatic change in beliefs about the appropriate role 
of the arts within society.   The most important shift, from the standpoint of the nonprofit 
arts, has been the gradual erosion of the hierarchical model of culture --- with European 
high culture at the top and other cultural forms arrayed beneath it --- that animated (and 
was in turn instantiated in) the creation of America’s first nonprofit orchestras and art 
museums in the late 19
th century (Gans 1985; DiMaggio 1991a).
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  The decline of the hierarchical model reflects not just a cognitive change but also 
a weakening of cognitive and institutional boundaries between high and popular culture.  
Since the 1970s, observers have noted a trend towards more popular-culture programm-
ing on the part of many traditional arts nonprofits (Peterson 1990).  A more recent and 
potentially equally important development is the entry of community-based commercial 
arts providers into networks that produce high-culture programming.  For example, in DiMaggio: Culture ---55--- 
2003, a Trenton nightclub that ordinarily features edgy pop music acts hosted a series of 
films, piano soloists, and academic-style panels as part of a festival celebrating the life 
and work of modernist composer George Antheil.
22  It is possible that  some community-
based nightspots will ultimately migrate to the nonprofit sector.  But it seems more likely 
that small for-profits may usurp portions of the nonprofit sector’s traditional role. 
  The expansion of the nonprofit arts.  The decline of cultural hierarchy opens the 
nonprofit arts sector to a wider range of genres and styles.   Some relatively new entrants 
are hybrids between high-culture art worlds and popular traditions.   Performance art, for 
example, features solo or ensemble performers who combine elements of drama, comedy, 
dance, or visual art into novel performances (Wheeler 1999; Pagani 2001).  It originated 
in the visual arts world but evolved to include participants with roots in theater, comedy, 
and music as well.  The nonprofit sector’s role in this field is largely that of presenter, 
providing venues in which these artists perform. 
The nonprofit arts sector has also embraced “media arts,” of which there have 
been two waves.  A first used film and video to created installations that incorporated 
moving images into static assemblies.  Although some projects required large exhibition 
spaces like the retooled factory that houses the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary 
Art, smaller video loops and similar creations fit easily into ordinary museum spaces.   A 
second wave has employed digital technologies with more radical consequences for ex-
hibit organization due to the suitability of the Internet for broadcasting digital works.  
Another case of intersectoral drift is the once entirely proprietary field of circus entertain-
ment, which now includes a significant nonprofit minority, the most prominent of which, DiMaggio: Culture ---56--- 
like Big Apple Circus and Cirque du Soleil, boast more sophisticated self-presentations 
and more upscale, urban audiences than the Big Top’s traditional denizens.       
The art world has also become increasingly open to nonprofit organizations that 
promote distinctly American based in folk or popular culture.   Two genres, craft art and 
jazz, were at the forefront of this development.   A recent canvass of craft organizations 
enumerates 1329 nonprofits devoted to craft art, including 88 museums, 315 galleries, 
and 105 festivals or craft art centers.
23   For jazz, nonprofit and philanthropic sponsorship 
has lagged behind critical esteem and academic respectability.   Although more than 90 
percent of the jazz groups enumerated in the Census are commercial, the nonprofit sector 
is making inroads, however, with jazz societies, service organizations and museums, and 
even some jazz ensembles.
24   Jazz performers who employ the nonprofit form include a 
few typical small jazz ensembles; performing groups affiliated with college or university 
music departments; and groups sponsored by organizations devoted to fostering African-
American cultural identity.   Some of the largest are preservationist,  devoted, like the 
first symphony orchestras, to defining and preserving a musical canon.  A few large en-
sembles, like the Nebraska Jazz Orchestra (2002), have adopted all the institutional trap-
pings of symphony orchestras.
25   
More recently, organizations that present musical forms associated with a wide 
range of ethnic identities have adopted the nonprofit form: for example, the Minnesota 
Chinese Music Ensemble, the Baltimore Klezmer Orchestra, an Irish Heritage Festival in 
West Virginia and an Omaha, Nebraska mariachi orchestra.
26   The nonprofit form has 
also migrated to older popular American forms, like bluegrass music and rural blues.   
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Folklife and Cultural Heritage) are also evident in the small but important field dedicated 
to preserving the recorded heritage by transferring at-risk recordings to new media.   
The nonprofit sector is even represented (more faintly) in pop culture fields that 
are younger (the nonprofit organization Urban Think Tank publishes the Journal of Rap 
Music and Hip Hop Culture) or of doubtful repute (California’s Exotic World Burlesque 
Museum commemorates and honors nude dancing, burlesque and striptease [Kellogg 
2002]).   The nonprofit cutting edge often involves efforts to impart academic respectab-
ility or historical legitimacy to genres that have lacked either.  Other examples of early 
nonprofit ventures dedicated to conservation and consecration are Nashville’s Country 
Music Museum and Hall of Fame and Mississippi’s Delta Blues Museum.   
Less distinct lines between nonprofit and commercial cultural organizations.   At 
the same time that the weakening of cultural hierarchy has expanded the nonprofit arts 
sector’s scope, it has made nonprofit cultural organizations more vulnerable to the impos-
ition of values and methods imported from the proprietary sector.  Increasingly, the lang-
uage of commerce permeates the board rooms and hallways of traditional arts organizat-
ions, as nonprofit managers adopt for-profit planning models and marketing techniques to 
placate business trustees and corporate donors (Stone 1989; Alexander 1996).   Although 
many arts organizations have benefited from adopting business management tools, others 
have wasted time and resources on symbolic gestures; and some have imported not just 
techniques, but also vocabularies of motive, including “bottom-line” justifications for 
program decisions, from the for-profit sector (Kenyon 1995).    
Similarly, erosion of the cognitive boundary between high and popular culture 
reduces resistance to the commercialization of nonprofit arts organizations.   Early high-DiMaggio: Culture ---58--- 
culture institutions shunned the market, lest they profane their sacred mission (DiMaggio 
1982).  In recent years, however, museums, performing-arts organizations, and public 
broadcasters have embraced commercialism in many ways (Silverman 1986; Powell and 
Friedkin 1986; Wu 2001).   Although in theory business activities cross-subsidize core 
missions, commercial success often becomes a goal in itself, competing with artistic ob-
jectives.   Moreover, commercial successes may paradoxically undermine the rationale 
for government and philanthropic subsidy (DiMaggio 1986; Toepler 2001).  Under such 
circumstances, policy makers who care about the arts have searched for new rationales to 
justify continued subsidy.  
Two such rationales have become prominent, each representing a growth areas for 
nonprofit cultural entrepreneurship.   The arts have long played a key role in many urban 
development projects (Lincoln Center, or for that matter Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, 
which was originally sited near the public library in Back Bay at the heart of America’s 
first culturally anchored urban development project).   But the practice accelerated to-
wards the end of the 20
th century (Whitt 1987; Strom 1999), bolstered by the success of 
projects like Newark’s NJPAC,  the efforts of arts advocates, and some evidence from 
academic researchers that the presence of artists and cultural organizations is associated 
with urban prosperity (Florida 2002) and neighborhood stability (Stern 2000).    
Cultural policy analysts have also devoted attention to issues of “cultural herit-
age.”   Whereas “heritage” was once code for the preservation of stately homes, its refer-
ents are now far broader --- 19
th-century workers’ housing, public buildings of architect-
ural value, and the non-built heritage of musical recordings, choreography, and folklore 
as well.  Although class politics invariably enters into allocation, as a general criterion for DiMaggio: Culture ---59--- 
cultural subvention heritage is politically attractive for its democratic thrust.  And the 
rationale for heritage preservation has been deepened by scholars who have probed the 
analogy between the cultural and the natural environments (Throsby 2001).    
Technological Change and Economic Concentration 
A dramatic increase in the media industries’ concentration has narrowed distribution 
channels at the same time that the rise of digital recording and communications technol-
ogy has reduced barriers to entry and challenged business models that have sustained for-
profit culture industries for decades.   When the dust clears, for-profit firms may provide 
some services that nonprofits do today, while nonprofits take over niches hitherto restrict-
ed to the proprietary sector.    
  New digital technologies undermine old business models in several ways.  Most 
notably, any recording (of a piece of music, a film, or a photograph or other artwork) can 
be almost instantaneously transmitted at virtually no variable cost.  First the recording in-
dustry and now Hollywood have seen their hottest new products distributed freely world-
wide, sometimes before the official release date.   The entertainment conglomerates have 
responded vigorously with lawsuits and technical fixes, but at this writing, the hackers 
have stayed one step ahead.   The big companies will have to find a new business model 
that includes distribution for profit over the Internet.  What effect this quest will have on 
the intersectoral division of labor remains to be seen. 
  An equally important effect of the digital revolution has been a dramatic reduction 
in barriers to entry in many fields, continuing a trend originating in declining prices in the 
electronics market that antedated the Internet’s rise.   Sound recordings that would have 
absorbed thousands of dollars of studio time a few years ago, can be cut on relatively in-DiMaggio: Culture ---60--- 
expensive equipment in a teenager’s basement today.   Costs have likewise fallen for 
magazine publishing and, to a lesser extent, photography, film, and animation.  Yet the 
democratization of artistic production occurred alongside a concentration of the means of 
distribution.  The Internet solves the technical distribution problem by reducing variable 
cost to close to zero.  But in so doing it creates an economy of attention scarcity that dis-
advantages artists without the marketing power the media giants possess. 
  The combination of an unprecedented abundance of product with an unprecedent-
edly concentrated corporate media sector creates an opportunity for nonprofit organizat-
ions in the field of distribution.   In some cases, such organizations will operate in the 
physical world, as do several grant-supported organizations devoted to marketing and 
distributing small-press fiction, a field in which  the concentration of commercial pub-
lishing has made small literary presses the primary publishers of first novels by talented 
young writers.   One can imagine the nonprofit form moving further downstream to the 
consumer, as well, with nonprofit bookstores and record stores joining nonprofit art film 
houses, museum stores, and cafes in an enlarged arena of nonprofit cultural retailing.    
  Indeed, nonprofits have long been active in some forms of distribution and retail-
ing: museum shops and college book stores are significant examples (National Associat-
ion of College Stores 2003).   Nonprofit galleries, often artists cooperatives, have em-
erged as significant alternative to for-profit galleries in the fine arts and, especially, 
crafts.
27   And while independent book stores have not yet used the nonprofit form, under 
pressure by chains and on-line bookstores, many of the surviving independents have 
taken on some functions of libraries (offering public programs, sponsoring reading 
groups, and so on).   It seems a small step for some to reincorporate as nonprofit institut-DiMaggio: Culture ---61--- 
ions, selling books as a “related business activity” that supports broader educational 
functions. 
In other fields, virtual nonprofits may serve to link artists and potential publics.   
The Internet’s advantage for cultural intermediation is its ability to harness the power of 
distributed intelligence through peer rating systems.  The combination of peer reviews 
and network algorithms that on-line businesses like Amazon and Netflix use to recom-
mend books and films are readily applicable to organizing smaller markets for artistically 
ambitious alternatives to the products of media conglomerates.   
Whether or not nonprofits this niche remains unclear.   In some cases new net-
work-based enterprises that are not organized as 501(c)3s have begun to organize the pro-
duction of collective goods.   Take for example an independent music site that provides a 
free space for bands to advertise their records or tour dates, gains the trust of surfers will-
ing to donate a few minutes of their time to write reviews or edifying dialogue, and offers 
free web-based information services to aspiring musicians (while also using the web site 
to sell recordings of bands its owners keep under contract, t-shirts and related paraphern-
alia).   The key mechanism is the ability of networks to compile and share information at 
very low cost:  Many people may contribute content to such sites not out of any deep 
faith in the proprietors, but because it is easy and fun to do so.   The Internet ensures that 
very limited commitment can go a long way if it is shared by thousands of people.   
At present, the relationship between legal form and self-presentation appears to be 
blurred on-line, with many web sites devoted to the production of public goods (for ex-
ample, information exchange among digital artists or restaurant aficionados) describing 
themselves as “nonprofit” and even soliciting donations to help keep their sites on line, DiMaggio: Culture ---62--- 
apparently without benefit of 501(c)3 registration.   Such sites as digitalart.org or Chow-
hound.com, or indiegrrl.com are, by all accounts, genuinely nonprofit in ethos.   It is 
likely that they are organized as, in effect, sole proprietorships for the same reason that 
other “minimalist organizations” retain that form, i.e., that they control few assets and 
lack realistic prospects for significant philanthropic fund-raising, so would not find the 
trouble or expense of incorporation worthwhile.  It seems possible that the Internet cult-
ure (Castells 2001) has produced an alternative model that elides the line between charit-
able and mutual-benefit associations and between nonprofit and for-profit enterprise.
28   
  In the non-digital world, industrial concentration has created opportunities for 
new enterprises that sell works that, while profitable, are not profitable enough for the 
giants.  In the popular music industry, industrial concentration may have enhanced inno-
vation, as conglomerates have designed strategies that sustain diversity while opening 
niches for small independent companies (“indies”) that record a wide range of talented 
artists working in and across every genre (Dowd forthcoming).  Although they are finan-
cial dwarfs, the hundreds of independent record companies are an artistically vital part of 
the industry.   Moreover, many operate with a nonprofit ethos, foregoing commercial suc-
cess in the interest of substantive aesthetic ends (Gray 1988).   They ordinarily adopt the 
nonprofit form, however, only when sound recording follows from a broader mission.  
For example, Appalshop, an entrepreneurial nonprofit multi-arts program in rural Ken-
tucky, has created a subsidiary, Appal Records, which records Appalachian folk singers; 
and the Electronic Music Foundation, which promotes the work of serious composers us-
ing electronic media, has created a record label to publish important but unavailable 
works.  If other states’ arts councils follow New York’s in offering grants to nonprofit DiMaggio: Culture ---63--- 
record companies, their numbers will increase (New York State Council for the Arts 
2002).  In states that do not offer the promise of grants from government agencies or 
private foundations, few small record companies have had reason to incorporate as 
501(c)3s.  Time will tell whether the indies evolve into a nonprofit sector of the recording 
industry or continue to pursue value-rational purposes by other means. 
Conclusion: Research Priorities 
Whether one’s interests are driven by theory development, substantive curiosity, or pol-
icy relevance, research opportunities abound.   Whereas many kind of rigorous empirical 
research on nonprofit arts organizations, especially comparative research across nonprofit 
and other sectors, were once virtually impossible, recent efforts to improve data quality 
and availability make the quest for rigor less quixotic.   A sustained commitment by the 
National Endowment for the Arts, Research Division, supplemented by programs of the 
Pew Charitable Trusts and other foundations have paid off in several improvements.   
Notable among them are the enhanced quality of cultural data in the Census of Business; 
the Urban Institute’s success in building data bases out of IRS Form 990s (including its 
collaboration with the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies to create the Uniform 
Data Base on Arts Organizations); and Princeton University’s establishment of the 
Cultural Policy and the Arts Data Archives (CPANDA), which permits on-line analysis 
or downloading of dozens of data sets relevant to arts and cultural policy studies. 
Theory Testing and Theory Development 
I have already identified a series of theoretical challenges.  Why are some performing-
arts activities articulated by contract whereas others are organized through hierarchy?   
To what extent do endemic deficits in nonprofit arts organizations reflect the “cost dis-DiMaggio: Culture ---64--- 
ease,” and to what extent do they stem from organizational expansion or other managerial 
choices?   What explains the presence of embedded arts programs in organizations out-
side the arts, and how might our understanding of the origins of nonprofit cultural enter-
prise change once we take these into account?   How can we understand the division of 
labor among the sectors in the few fields – for example, performing-arts presentation and 
radio broadcasting – where all three are present?  What accounts for the increase in hy-
brid arts organizations and interorganizational (and sometimes intersectoral)?   What the-
ories can provide the greatest purchase over “minimalist” arts organizations, including 
sole proprietorships and very small multi-person firms:  Is it more productive to view 
them as for-profits (which they are as a legal matter), nonprofits (when they are nonprofit 
in ethos), or as means for workers to survive difficult labor markets?   Why do public and 
for-profit cultural firms rarely co-exist in the same fields?   How do size, capital intens-
iveness, and cost structures interact to influence the intersectoral division of labor?   Why 
are there for-profit art museums and nonprofit circuses?    
  In order to address such questions we need to develop more sophisticated and rig-
orous analytic methods.   Too often we have been forced to test theories about the origins 
of nonprofit enterprise by anecdote and example or, at best, by cross-sectional comparis-
ons.   Yet our best theories are both probabilistic (they identify important and pervasive 
tendencies, not iron laws) and evolutionary (they make predictions, at least implicitly, 
about conditions influencing the relative rates of birth and death of nonprofit, as opposed 
to for-profit or government, firms).   In order to give public-choice, market-failure, and 
other theories a fair hearing, we must develop over-time population data that enable us to 
test them in the context of realistic models of population dynamics (DiMaggio 2003).    DiMaggio: Culture ---65--- 
Substantive Issues: Understanding Organizational Change 
Other research priorities, although theoretically relevant, are matters of greater practical 
concern.   Exploratory research on new nonprofit roles in the arts and culture is necessary 
to illuminate emerging nonprofit fields on which standardized data systems do not yet re-
port.   We need to better understand the emergence of nonprofit enterprise in the present-
ation and exhibition of art forms that have in the past been largely commercial: Who are 
the pioneers, what causes them to choose the nonprofit form, and how do their organizat-
ions’ structures and missions differ from those of their for-profit counterparts?   We need 
similar studies of the role of nonprofit and commercial organizations in identity-based 
cultural organizations, for example those associated with new immigrant groups and em-
erging faith communities?  Finally, we need systematic research on the organizational 
forms that are emerging (both on-line and off) to address new dilemmas in marketing and 
distribution.   What are the advantages and disadvantages of the nonprofit form in the re-
tailing and distribution of mechanically and digitally reproduced artworks, and what role 
might nonprofits play in bringing diverse products to the attention of audiences who 
would otherwise not encounter them?   
Policy Studies 
Although many of the topics I have mentioned will be of interest to cultural policy mak-
ers in the public and philanthropic sectors, two policy research priorities are particularly 
urgent.   First, we need research that will predict enable grantmakers to assess the relat-
ionship between organizational form and behavioral differences relevant to the values – 
for example, artistic excellence, education and access, innovation and diversity – that 
cultural policy makers ordinarily wish to promote.   Emphasis should be placed on DiMaggio: Culture ---66--- 
rigorous comparisons that explore the conditions under which organizational form influ-
ences such behavioral differences, either directly or through elements of strategy and 
structure with respect to which different forms vary.   Furthermore, such studies should 
go beyond mere comparison in two ways.   They should explain why observed differ-
ences exist, and, therefore, provide guidance as to whether such patterns are replicable 
through policy incentives.   And they should define organizational form more broadly 
than “nonprofit” versus “for-profit,” including comparisons between pure types, on the 
one hand, and hybrid and embedded organizations, on the other.    
A second priority for policy-relevant research is to undertake community cultural-
resource studies that view arts organizations as interrelated parts of coherent systems.  
Increasingly, grantmakers seek not simply to sustain significant institutions, but also to 
enhance the role of the arts in community life.  From this perspective, it is important that 
we learn not just about institutions (or artists), but about the relationships that sustain a 
community’s arts institutions and link them to other arenas of public life.  In particular, 
we need studies that can reveal the ways in which cultural organizations in different 
sectors – free-standing nonprofits, embedded nonprofits, government, commercial 
entities, and unincorporated associations – interact to produce collective goods.   What is 
the relationship, for example, between the robustness of informal neighborhood arts 
associations and arts schools, on the one hand, and the vitality of professional institutions, 
on the other?  In what ways do different kinds of art organization compete, and in what 
ways do their programs reinforce one another by building audiences, training artists, or 
enhancing the attractiveness of the arts to philanthropists? 
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*      *     * 
These research priorities, like this chapter as a whole, reflect two premises that, although 
they are increasingly shared, are still somewhat controversial.   First, one can only under-
stand the nonprofit sector by comparing its scope and behavior to that of the public and 
commercial sectors.   Second, understanding the current and likely future importance of 
the nonprofit arts sector involves focusing on a broader range of cultural nonprofits, in-
cluding embedded and minimalist arts organizations, than analysts ordinarily take into ac-
count.   Such nonprofit arts organizations as museums, orchestras and dance and theater 
companies will remain central to the sector.  But the rate of growth in these fields will 
continue to slow.   If we want to grasp the dynamism of the nonprofit sector in art and 
culture, we must focus on those less well institutionalized portions of the organizational 
universe from which new functions and future directions continually emerge. DiMaggio: Culture ---68--- 
 References 
Alexander, Victoria. 1996. Museums & Money: The Impact of Funding on Exhibitions, 
Scholarship and Management. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Allen, Susan. 1998. “Nonprofit and Commercial Music: Three Musicians’ Experience.” 
Journal of Arts Management and Law 28: 145-54. 
Alper, Neil and Gregory Wassall. 2000. More Than Once in A Blue Moon: Multiple 
Jobholdings by American Artists. Santa Ana, California: Seven Locks Press. 
American Assembly. 1997. “The Arts and the Public Purpose.” Final Report of the 92
nd 
American Assembly, May 29-June 1, 1997.  New York: American Assembly. 
Anheier, Helmut and Stefan Toepler. 1998. “Commerce and the Muse: Are Art Museums 
Becoming Commercial?”  Pp. 233-48 in To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commerc-
ial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector, edited by Burton Weisbrod. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Arian, Edward. 1971. Bach, Beethoven and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Philadelphia 
Orchestra. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 
Backer, Thomas E. 2002. Partnership as an Art Form: What Works and What Doesn’t in 
Nonprofit Arts Partnerships. Report to the John S. and James L. Knight 
Foundation. Encino, Calif: Human Interaction Research Institute. 
Baker, Wayne and Robert Faulkner. 1991. Role as resource in the Hollywood film 
industry.  American Journal of Sociology 97: 279-309. 
Baumol, William J. and William G. Bowen. 1966. The Performing Arts: The Economic 
Dilemma. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. 
Becker, Howard S. 1982. Art Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press. DiMaggio: Culture ---69--- 
Bell, John. 1987. “Industrials: American Business Theatre in the ‘80s.” The Drama 
Review 31: 22-43. 
Bielby, William T. and Denise D. Bielby. 1994.  `'All hits are flukes':  Institutionalized 
decision making and the rhetoric of network prime-time program development.  
American Journal of Sociology 59:  1287-1313 
Blaug, Mark. 2001. “Cultural Economics.” Journal of Economic Surveys 15: 123-43. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Reproduction: In Education, Culture, Society. Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications. 
Bowen, William G., Thomas I. Nygren, Sarah E. Turner and Elizabeth A. Duffy. 1994. 
The Charitable Nonprofits. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Brooks, Arthur. 2003 (forthcoming).  “Nonprofit Firms in the Performing Arts.” The 
Economics of Art and Culture.  North-Holland Handbooks in Economics Series. 
Cameron, Catherine M. 1991. “The New Arts Industry: Non-Profits in an Age of 
Competition.” Human Organization 50: 225-34. 
Carroll, Glenn R. 1985. Concentration and specialization: Dynamics of niche width in 
populations of organizations. American Journal of Sociology 90: 1263-1283. 
Castells, Manuel. 2001. The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and 
Society. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Caves, Richard E. 2000. Creative Industries: Contracts Between Art and Commerce. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Chaves, Mark A. 1999. How Do We Worship? Washington, D.C.: Alban Institute. DiMaggio: Culture ---70--- 
Chaves, Mark A. and Peter V. Marsden. 2000. Congregations and cultural capital: 
Religious variations in arts activity. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the 
American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C. 
Cohen, Michael D. and James G. March. Leadership and Ambiguity:The American 
College President, 2nd ed. Boston.: Harvard Business School Press, 1986.  
Colonna, Carl M., Patricia M. Kearns and John E. Anderson. 1993. “Electronically 
Produced Music and its Economic Effects on the Performing Musician and the 
Music Industry.” Journal of Cultural Economics 17: 69-76. 
Cultural Policy and the Arts National Data Archive (CPANDA). 2003. “National Trends 
in Artists Occupations: Artists Compared to Other Occupations, 1970-2001.” 
http//artsdata.Princeton.edu/arts-culture-facts/artists/brfrcothoccu.html. Last 
visited June 26, 2003. 
Davidson, Benjamin. 2001. Local Arts Agency Facts: Fiscal Year 2000. Washington, 
D.C.: Americans for the Arts. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1982. Cultural entrepreneurship in nineteenth-century Boston, Pt. I: The 
creation of an organizational base for high culture in America and Pt. II: Cultural 
entrepreneurship in nineteenth-century Boston, Part II: The classification and 
framing of American art. Media, Culture and Society 4: 33-50, 303-22. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1986. “Can Culture Survive the Marketplace?” Pp. 65-92 in Nonprofit 
Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint, ed. Paul DiMaggio. 
New York: Oxford University Press. DiMaggio: Culture ---71--- 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1991a. Social structure, institutions, and cultural goods: The case of the 
U.S. Pp. 133-55 in Social Theory for a Changing Society, ed. by Pierre Bourdieu 
and James Coleman. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1991b. “Notes on the relationship between art museums and their 
publics.” Pp. 39-50 in The Economics of Art Museums, edited by Martin Feld-
stein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1991c. “ Constructing an organizational field as a professional project: 
The case of U.S. art museums.” Pp. 267-92 in The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1992a. Cultural boundaries and structural change: The extension of the 
high-culture model to theatre, opera, and the dance, 1900-1940. In Cultivating 
Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality, ed. by Michèle 
Lamont and Marcel Fournier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 2003. “An Ecological Perspective on Nonprofit Research.” Pp. 311-20 
in The Study of Nonprofit Enterprise: Theories and Approaches, edited by Helmut 
K. Anheier and Avner Ben-Ner. New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum.  
DiMaggio, Paul and Becky Pettit. 1997. Public Sentiments towards the Arts: A Critical 
Reanalysis of 13 Public Opinion Surveys.  Report to Pew Charitable Trusts. 
Princeton: Princeton University Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies. 
DiMaggio, Paul and Kristen Stenberg.  1985a. Conformity and diversity in American 
resident theatres. Pp. 116-60 in Art, Ideology and Politics, ed. Judith H. Balfe and 
Margaret Jane Wyszomirski. New York: Praeger. DiMaggio: Culture ---72--- 
DiMaggio, Paul and Kristen Stenberg. 1985b. Why do some theatres innovate more than 
others? (With Kristen Stenberg.) Poetics 14: 107-22.  
Dowd, Timothy J. “Organizing the musical Canon: The Repertoires of Major U.S. 
Symphony Orchestras, 1842 to 1969.” 2002. Poetics 30: 35-61. 
Dowd, Timothy J. Forthcoming. The Mitigated Impact of Concentration on Diversity: 
New Performing Acts and New Firms in the   Mainstream Recording Market, 1940 
– 1990.  Social Forces.  
Eisner, Elliot W. and Stephen M. Dobbs. 1986. The Uncertain Profession: Observations on 
the State of Museum Education in Twenty American Art Museums. Report to the 
Getty Center for Education in the Arts. 
Feld, Alan L. Michael O’Hare and J. Mark Davidson Schuster. 1983.  Patrons Despite 
Themselves: Taxpayers and Arts Policy. New York: New York University Press. 
Florida, Richard. 2002. “Bohemia and Economic Geography.” Journal of Economic 
Geography 2: 55-71. 
Frank,. Robert H. and Philip J. Cook. 1995. The Winner-Take-All Society. New York: 
Free Press. 
Freedman, Marc R. 1986. "The Elusive Promise of Management Cooperation in the 
Performing Arts." Pp. 299-313 in Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in 
Mission and Constraint, ed. Paul DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Frey, Bruno. 1994. “The Economics of Music Festivals.” Journal of Cultural 
Economics 18: 29-39. 
Frey, Bruno. 1996. “Has Baumol’s Cost Disease Disappeared in the Performing 
Arts?” Ricerche Economiche 50: 173-82. DiMaggio: Culture ---73--- 
Frey, Bruno S. and Werner W. Pommerehne. 1980. “An Economic Analysis of the 
Museum.” Pp. 248-59 in Economic Policy for the Arts, edited by William 
Hendon, James Shanahan and Alice MacDonald. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1985. The Social Organization of an Urban Grants Economy. 
Orlando, Florida: Academic Press. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1997. “Niche Position and the Growth and Decline of Nonprofit 
Organizations.” Manuscript, University of Minnesota. 
Gans, Herbert. 1985.  American popular culture and high culture in a changing class 
structure. Prospects: An Annual of American Cultural Studies 10: 17-37.  
Grams, Diane and Michael Warr. 2002. “Leveraging Assets: How Small Budget Arts 
Activities Benefit Neighborhoods.” Report to the Richard H. Driehaus Foundation 
and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Ms., DePaul University. 
Gray, Herman. 1988. Producing Jazz: The Experience of an Independent Record 
Company. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Greco, Albert N. 2000. “Market Concentration Levels in the U.S. Consumer Book 
Industry: 1995-1996.” Journal of Cultural Economics 24: 321-36. 
Gronjberg, Kirsten. A. 2002. “Evaluating Nonprofit Databases.” American Behavioral 
Scientist 45: 1741-77. 
Hager, Mark A. 2001. “Financial Vulnerability Among Arts Organizations: A Test of the 
Tuckman-Change Measures.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quart. 30: 376-92. 
Hager, Mark A. and Thomas H. Pollak. 2002. The Capacity of Performing Arts 
Presenting Organizations. Washington: The Urban Institute. DiMaggio: Culture ---74--- 
Hall, Peter Dobkin. 1992. Inventing the Nonprofit Sector. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Halliday, Terence C., M. J. Powell and M. W. Granfors. 1987. “Minimalist Organizat-
ions: Vital Events in State Bar Associations, 1870-1930.”  American Sociological 
Review 52:456-471. 
Hallock, Kevin F. 2002. “Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits.” 
Industrial Relations 41: 377-406. 
Hannan, Michael and John Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Hansmann, Henry. 1981. Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts. Bell Journal of 
Economics 12 (2): 341-61. 
Heckathorn, Douglas and Joan Jeffri. 2003.  Patterns of Affiliation In Two Jazz 
Musician Communities. Paper presented at annual meetings of the American Sociological 
Association, August. 2003. 
Heilbrun, James. 2001. “Empirical Evidence of a Decline in Repertory Diversity among 
American Opera Companies, 1991/92 to 1997/98.” Journal of Cultural Econom-
ics 25: 63-72. 
Heilbrun, James and Charles M. Gray. 2001. The Economics of Art and Culture, 2
nd 
edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hout, Michael, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde. 2001. “The Demography of Re-
ligious Change in the United States.” American journal of Sociology 107: 468-
500. DiMaggio: Culture ---75--- 
James, Estelle. 1987. “The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective.” Pp. 397-415.in 
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (1
st ed.), edited by Walter W. 
Powell. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Jeffri, Joan. 1980. The Emerging Arts: Management, Survival and Growth. New York: 
Praeger.  
Jeffri, Joan and Robert Greenblatt. 1994. Artists Who Work With Their Hands: Painters, 
Sculptors, Craftspeople and Artist Printmakers, A Trend Report 1970-1990 in  
Artist in the Workforce.  Research Report #37. Washington, DC: National 
Endowment for the Arts. 
Jencks, Christopher. 1986. Should the News be Sold For Profit? Pp. 279-84 in Nonprofit 
Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint, edited by Paul 
DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kaple, Deborah A., Lori Morris, Ziggy Rivkin-Fish and Paul DiMaggio. 1996. Data on 
Arts Organizations: A Review and Needs Assessment, with Design Implications.  
Report to the National Endowment for the Arts, Research Division.  Princeton: 
Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies. 
Kaple, Deborah, Ziggy Rivkin-Fish, Hugh Louch, Lori Morris, and Paul DiMaggio. 
1998. Comparing Sample Frames for Research on Arts Organizations: Results of 
a Study in Three Metropolitan Areas.  Journal of Arts Management, Law and 
Society 28: 41-66. 
Kaple, Deborah. 2002. . Current Data Resources on Nonprofit Arts Organizations.” 
American Behavioral Scientist 45: 1592-1612. DiMaggio: Culture ---76--- 
Kawashima, Nobuko. 1999. “Privatizing Museum Services in UK Local Authorities: 
New Managerialism in Action?” Public Management 1: 157-77. 
Kellogg, Stuart. “Vavoom.” Victorville (CA) Daily Press. http://www.vvdaily-
press.com/living/vavoom/  Last accessed Aug. 24, 2002. 
Kendall, Elizabeth. 1979.  Where She Danced. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Kenyon, Gerald S. 1995. “Market Economy Discourse in Nonprofit High-Status Art 
Worlds.” Journal of Arts Management and Law 25: 109-24. 
King, Millie Mei-Vung. 1980. “Through the Eyes of Boston: The State of 
Chamber Music Today.” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University. 
Kirstein, Lincoln. 1938 [1967]. Blast at Ballet: A Corrective for the American Audience. 
Reprinted in Lincoln Kirstein, Three Pamphlets Collected. New York: Dance 
Horizons. 
Kreidler, John. 1996. “Leverage Lost: The Nonprofit Arts in the Post-Ford Era.” Journal of 
Arts Management, Law and Society 26: 79-100. 
Kuan, Jennifer. 2001. “The Phantom Profits of the Opera: Nonprofit Ownership in the Arts 
as a Make-Buy Decision.” Journal of Law and Economic Organization 17:507-20. 
Lampkin, Linda M. and Elizabeth T. Boris.  2002.  Nonprofit organizations data: What 
we have and what we need. American Behavioral Scientist 11: 1675-1715 
Levine, Lawrence. 1990.  Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in 
America.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lopes, Paul D. 2002. The Rise of a Jazz Art World. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Luksetich, William A. and Mark D. Lange. 1995. “A Simultaneous Model of Nonprofit 
Symphony Orchestra Behavior.” Journal of Cultural Economics 19: 49-68. DiMaggio: Culture ---77--- 
Macro Systems, Inc. 1979. Contractor Report: Museums Program Survey 1979. 
Washington D.C.: National Center for Educational Statistics. 
March, James G. 1962. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics 
24: 662-78. 
Martorella, Rosanne. 1990. Corporate Art. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ-
ersity Press. 
McDaniel, Nello and George Thorn. 1991. The Quiet Crisis in the Arts. New York: 
FEDAPT. 
Miller, Mark Crispin. 1997. “The Publishing Industry.” In Conglomerates and the Media, 
edited by Erik Barnouw. New York: The New Press. 
Milofsky, Carl. 1987. “Neighborhood-Based Organizations: A Market Analogy.” Pp. 
277-95 in Handbook of Research on Nonprofit Organizations, ed. Walter W. 
Powell.  New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mitchell, Caroline A. 1986. “Graywolf Press.” Manuscript, Yale School of Organization 
and Management. 
Murnighan, J. Keith and D.E. Conlon. “The Dynamics of Intense Work Groups.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 165-86. 
National Association of College Stores. 2003. “Industry Information.” http://www.nacs. 
org/public/research/higher_ed_retail.asp. Last visited January 28, 2003. 
National Task Force for the American Orchestra. 1993. Americanizing the American 
Orchestra. Washington, D.C.: American Symphony Orchestra League. 
Nebraska Jazz Orchestra. 2002. Nebraska Jazz Orchestra website. 
http://artsincorporated.org/njo/.  Last accessed Aug. 26, 2002. DiMaggio: Culture ---78--- 
New York State Council for the Arts. 2002. Guidelines, “Recording: Category 69 
(Competitive Category), p. 102.  http://www.nysca.org/guidelines/102.htm. Last 
visited August 24, 2002. 
O’Hagan and Neligan. 2002. “The Determinants of Repertoire Diversity in the Non-
Profit English Theatre Sector: An Econometric Analysis. Manuscript, Trinity 
College, Dublin. 
Orlean, Susan. 2001. “Art for Everybody: How Thomas Kinkade Turned Painting into 
Big Business.” The New Yorker, October 15, pp. 124ff. 
Oster, Sharon and William N. Goetzmann. 2002. “Does Governance Matter: The Case of 
Art Museums.” Paper Prepared for National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
shop on Not-for-Profit Institutions. New Haven: Yale School of Management. 
Ostrower, Francie. 1995. Why the Wealthy Give: The Culture of Elite Philanthropy. 
Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrower, Francie. 2002. Trustees of Culture: Power, Wealth, and Status on Elite Arts 
Boards. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Pagani, Jacqualine. 2001. “Mixing Art and Life: The Conundrum of the Avant-Garde’s 
Autonomous Status in the Performance Art World of Los Angeles. The 
Sociological Quarterly 42: 175-203. 
Peterson, Richard A. 1972. A process model of the folk, pop, and fine art phases of jazz. 
Pp. 135-51 in American music: From Storyville to Woodstock, ed., Charles Nanry. 
New Brunswick, N.J.: Trans-Action Books and E.P. Dutton.  
Peterson, Richard A. 1990. “Audience and Industry Origins of the Crisis in Classical 
Music Programming: Toward World Music.” Pp. 207-23 in The Future of the DiMaggio: Culture ---79--- 
Arts: Public Policy and Arts Research, ed. David B. Pankratz and Valerie Morris. 
New York: Praeger. 
Peterson, Richard A. and Howard G. White. 1979. “The Simplex Located in Art Worlds.” 
Urban Life 7: 411-439.   
Powell, Walter W. 1985. Getting into Print: The Decision-Making Process in Scholarly 
Publishing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Powell, Walter W. 2001. “The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging 
Patterns in Western Enterprise.” Pp. 33-68 in The Twenty-First-Century Firm: 
Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, ed. Paul 
DiMaggio. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Powell, Walter W. and Rebecca Friedkin. 1986. “Politics and Programs: Organizational 
Factors in Public Television Decision Making.” Pp. 245-69 in Nonprofit 
Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint, ed. Paul DiMaggio. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Raymond, Eric S. 2001. The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open 
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary. Sebastopol, California: O’Reilly & 
Associates. 
Reed Business Information. 2003. Broadcasting & Cable Yearbook. New York: 
Broadcasting & Cable. 
Roper Starch Worldwide, Inc. 1998. 1998 National Survey: Business Support to the Arts. 
New York: Business Committee for the Arts. 
Rosen, Sherwin. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic Review 71: 
845-58. DiMaggio: Culture ---80--- 
Rudenstine, Neil. 1991. “Museum Finances.” Pp. 73-86 in The Economics of Art Muse-
ums, edited by Martin Feldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Salamon, Lester. 1987. “On Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third Party 
Government.” Journal of Voluntary Action Research 16:29-49. 
Schuster, J. Mark. 1999. “Neither Public Nor Private: The Hybridization of Museums.” 
Journal of Cultural Economics. 
Scott, Allen J. 2002. “A New Map of Hollywood: The Production and Distribution of 
American Motion Pictures.” Regional Studies 36: 957-75. 
Seley, John E. and Julian Wolpert. 2002. New York City’s Nonprofit Sector. New York: 
Community Studies of New York, Inc. and the Nonprofit Coordinating 
Committee of New York, Inc. 
Shanahan, James L. 1989. “Private Support for the Arts in U.S. Metropolitan Areas with 
United Arts Funds.” Journal of Cultural Economics 13: 35-51. 
Silverman, Debora. 1986. Selling Culture: Bloomingdale’s, Diana Vreeland, and the New 
Aristocracy of Taste in Reagan’s America. New York: Pantheon. 
Stern, Mark J. 2000. “The Geography of Cultural Production in Metropolitan 
Philadelphia.”  Working Paper #10 of the Social Impact of the Arts Project, 
University of Pennsylvania School of Social Work.  www.ssw.upenn.edu/SIAP, 
last accessed January 1, 2003. 
Stern, Mark J. and Susan C. Seifert. 2000a.  “Cultural Organizations in the Network 
Society.” Working Paper #11 of the Social Impact of the Arts Project. University 
of Pennsylvania School of Social Work. DiMaggio: Culture ---81--- 
Stern, Mark J. and Susan C. Seifer. 2000b. `Irrational Organizations’: Why Community-
Based Organizations are Really Social Movements.” Working Paper #12, Social 
Impact of the Arts Project. University of Pennsylvania School of Social Work. 
Steyn, Mark. 1997. “After the Ball: Bowie Bonds.” Slate, posted Thursday, May 8, 1997. 
Stone, Melissa M. 1989. “Planning as Strategy in Nonprofit Organizations: An 
Exploratory Study.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 18: 297-315. 
Storper, Michael. 1989. “The Transition to Flexible Specialisation in the US Film 
Industry: External Economies, the Division of Labour, and the Crossing of 
Industrial Divides.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 13: 273-305. 
Strom, Elizabeth. 1999. “Let’s Put on a Show: Performing Arts and Urban Revitalization 
in Newark, New Jersey.” Journal of Urban Affairs 21: 423-36. 
Strom, Elizabeth. 2001. “Converting Pork into Porcelain: Cultural Institutions and 
Downtown Development.” Manuscript, Rutgers University – Newark, N.J. 
Throsby, David. 2001. Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Throsby, David and Glenn A. Withers. 1979. The Economics of the Performing Arts. 
New York: St. Martin’s. 
Toepler, Stefan. 2001. “Culture, Commerce and Civil Society: Rethinking Support for the 
Arts.” Administration and Society 33: 508-22. 
Tschirhart, Mary. 1996. Artful Leadership: Managing Stakeholder Problems in Nonprofit 
Arts Organizations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2000. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Retail Trade: Establish-DiMaggio: Culture ---82--- 
ment and Firm Size Including Legal Form of Organization.  (NAICS Sector 44). 
Economic Census – EC97R44S-SZ. Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau–U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administ-
ration. 2001a. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Art, Entertainment & Rec-
reation (NAICS Sector 71). Economic Census – EC97S71S-SM. Washington, 
D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2001b. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Educational Services 
(NAICS Sector 61). Economic Census – EC97S61S-SM. Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2001c. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Information (NAICS 
Sector 51). Economic Census – EC97S51S-SM. Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2001d. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services (NAICS Sector 54). Economic Census – EC97S54S-SM. 
Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2001e. Economic Census 1997: (Subject Series) Accommodation and 
Food Services (NAICS Sector 72). Economic Census – EC97R72S-SM. 
Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Census Bureau – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin-
istration. 2001f. Economic Census 1997: (General Summary) Manufacturing.  
(NAICS Sector 31). Economic Census – EC97M31S-GS. Washington, D.C. DiMaggio: Culture ---83--- 
U.S. Census Bureau -- – U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics 
Administration. 2002. 1997 Economic Census, Retail Trade, United States.  
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000_44.HTM#N451.  Last accessed 
August 25, 2002. 
Valley Jazz Club. 2002. Los Angeles Area nonprofit jazz clubs. http://www.valley-
jazzclub.org/Jazz_Clubs/jazz_clubs.html. Last accessed August 26, 2002. 
Voss, Glenn, Daniel M. Cable, Zannie Giraud Voss. 2000. “Linking Organizational 
Values to Relationships with External Constituents: A Study of Nonprofit 
Professional Theatres.” Organization Science 11: 330-47. 
Weisbrod, Burton A. 1990. The Nonprofit Economy. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.  
Weisbrod, Burton. 1997. “The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private 
Enterprise and Government.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16: 
541-55. 
Weitzman, Murray S., Nadine T. Jalandoni, Linda M. Lampkin and Thomas H. Pollak. 
2002. The New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference. S.F.: Jossey-Bass. 
Wheeler, Britta. 1999. “The Institutionalization of Performance Art.”  Paper presented at 
the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Assoc., Washington, D.C. 
Whitt, J. Allen. 1987. “Mozart in the Metropolis: The Arts Coalition and the Urban 
Growth Machine.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 23: 15-36. 
Whitt, J. Allen and John Lammers. 1991. “The Art of Growth: Ties Between Develop-
ment Organizations and the Performing Arts.” Urban Affairs Quart.  26: 376-93. 
Wolf Organization, Inc.  1992.  The Financial Condition of Symphony Orchestras.  
Washington, D.C.: American Symphony Orchestra League. DiMaggio: Culture ---84--- 
Wu, Chin-Tao. 2001. Privatising Culture: Corporate Art Intervention Since the 1980s. 
New York: Verso. 
Zolberg, Vera, 1981. Conflicting visions of American art museums. Theory and Society 
10: 103-25.  DiMaggio: Culture ---85--- 
End Notes 
                                                 
1 Such estimates are intrinsically debatable.  It makes sense to include only filing organizations, because 
many of the organizations in the IRS lists that do not file are inactive; at the same time, this does lead to the 
exclusion of some active organizations that are not required to file because they have annual budgets have 
annual budgets of less than $25,000 (Bowen et al. 1994).   This figure also fails to count arts and cultural 
programs mounted by nonprofit organizations categorized under other headings (for example, private 
foundations that fund the arts; universities that support theater groups or film series, present concerts, and 
provide arts education; community groups that sponsor murals, use the arts in work with youth, and spon-
sor concerts and exhibitions in public parks; or churches that organize theater trips or whose choirs sing at 
festivals throughout their communities).   It also leaves out the myriad informal, unincorporated groups 
(chamber groups, book circles, immigrant cultural societies, and so on) that pursue artistic or other cultural 
ends and neither seek nor distribute positive net revenues, but lack legal standing as nonprofit entities.   In 
other words, the size of the sector depends on how one defines it. 
2 Kaple et al. (1996: 165) went beyond the usual data sources to identify all 501(c)3s with at least one pro-
fessional employee that presented or exhibited the arts, including organizations whose artistic programs 
were ancillary to a larger purpose.  Although Kaple et al. included “embedded” cultural organizations, un-
like Stern, they did not try to count freestanding associations without incorporated nonprofit status.   Stern 
found 1,204 “nonprofit arts and cultural providers,” but for comparative purposes I have only used fields 
covered by Kaple et al. (excluding history, humanities, libraries, science, and design arts) and organizations 
that mount their own performances or exhibitions (to which Kaple et al.’s organizations were limited).   In 
this comparison, adding freestanding unincorporated associations increased the count of organizations in  
Philadelphia from 309 to 650.  Even allowing for Stern’s more intensive data-collection effort, it is clear 
that including the informal, unincorporated arts sector greatly increases the nonprofit cultural sector’s size  
3 This problem is less acute for the performing arts because the National Endowment for the Arts, Research 
Division has graciously shared special tabulations that the Census Bureau produced at the Endowment’s re-
quest.  Interpretation of the less aggregated measures is complicated by the fact that detailed self-designat-
ions are available only for establishments that responded directly to the Census, and not for organizations DiMaggio: Culture ---86--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
for which data were gleaned only from administrative sources.  (Establishments that were part of multi-
establishment firms and establishments that employed more than a certain number of employees [which 
varied by industry] received mail questionnaires.  Smaller employer firms did not, and data on “firms” that 
employed no one during the previous year [a group that probably included most individual artists who 
define themselves as businesses for tax purposes] were excluded from published tabulations.)   
4 The for-profit sector is so preponderant in manufacturing and distribution of instruments, supplies, and 
mechanically reproduced or broadcast music and drama that the Census simply assumes without asking that 
firms are proprietary.  Motion picture distributors are corporate studios; most films are produced by ad hoc 
partnerships (Baker and Faulkner 1991) and distributed by large commercial firms.   Most television dram-
atic and comedy programs are produced by a few for-profit production companies (Bielby and Bielby 
1994).   Arts service industries that are exclusively or predominantly for-profit include music publishers, 
agents and artists’ representatives, advertising agencies that employ graphic artists and musicians (U.S. 
Census Bureau 1997d),  graphic design services, photography studios, and software publishers.  Also over-
whelmingly for-profit are retail establishments that sell musical instruments and sheet music and stores that 
specialize in selling new CDs, records, and tapes,  The major exception to this rule, for both recordings and 
books, comprises retail establishments embedded in nonprofit or government organizations – military 
commissaries, museum shops, and almost 2500 college and university book stores that are owned and run 
by the institutions.  Because retail operations are ancillary to such organizations’ major missions, such 
establishments rarely show up in the Economic Census. [All figures in this paragraph are from U.S. Census 
2002, except for the number of college university stores, which comes from National Association of 
College Stores 2003.]    
5Some economists say that there may be such a price but that a company that charged such a price would, 
in effect, exclude most of the population from access to its services, an outcome that would be undesirable 
given what are believed to be beneficial effects of exposure to high culture.     
6 In the context of a continuing game (i.e., arts organizations hoping that this year’s donors will give again 
next year), the nondistribution constraint is attractive because it is difficult for donors to monitor critical as-
pects of the product or production process.   Compared to the classic case of services purchased from non-DiMaggio: Culture ---87--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
profits by third parties on behalf of clients who cannot easily evaluate or report those services’ quality (e.g., 
young children, the infirm elderly, hospital patients with complex diseases),  the arts organizations’ exhibits 
and performances are highly visible; however the processes that bring them to the stage or gallery are often 
not visible at all.   For example, donors may need assurance that nonprofits will not use their gifts to boost 
the incomes of managers at the expense of working conditions for artists or services to the community. 
7 The relation between function and motive is complex: Much elite entrepreneurship was motivated by a 
pragmatic interest in educating designers and craftsmen (art museums) or by an ideological commitment to 
the value of classical music (the orchestras).   For more nuanced treatments of motivation see DiMaggio 
1982, 1991, 1992. 
8 The 1997 Census of Business reports that 11 percent of museums (of all kinds) are not tax-exempt.    
9 I am fortunate to have had use of a beta version of the Unified Database of Arts Organizations (UDAO), a 
valuable new resource created by the Urban Institute and the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies 
(NASAA) under contract to the National Endowment for the Arts, Research Division.   This data base, 
which is the closest thing we have had to a complete listing of nonprofit arts organizations (as well as a few 
for-profits) represents the union of data from the IRS Form 990s (which all nonprofit organizations with 
annual revenues of $25,000 or more are required to file annually) with NASAA’s data base of grantee lists 
and other lists provided annually by the United States’s fifty-seven state and territorial arts agencies (Lamp-
kin and Boris 2002; Kaple 2002).  The UDAO is particularly valuable for three reasons.  First, the IRS 990s 
provide particularly comprehensive listings of nonprofit organizations compared to alternative sources 
(Kaple et al. 1998; Gronjberg 2002).  Second, the data base permits some cross-walking between the 
serviceable but coarse-grained typology of organizations used by IRS and the National Center for Char-
itable Statistics, on the one hand, and the more refined, arts-focused typology that NASAA employs.  
Third, the data base identifies the organizations, so that researchers can add data and cases of their own. 
UDAO data are not comparable to Census tabulations, first, because the system does not yet have NAIC 
codes (the classification system that Census uses to sort establishments by industry) for most entries and, 
second, because it does not yet include systematically collected data on proprietary entities.  But although 
the UDAO cannot be used for intersectoral comparison, it is well equipped for more in-depth looks at DiMaggio: Culture ---88--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
Census’s “tax-exempt” categories and for asking to what extent nonprofit organizations are becoming 
active in new arenas.   
10 Organizational theorists refer to the process by which industrial concentration opens new markets to 
small firms as “niche partitioning” (Carroll 1985).   
11 Brooks (2003) notes that labor costs in the arts have risen faster in the U.S. than in other advanced 
industrial nations, a result that the theory would not predict (given the relatively small size of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector). 
12 To estimate the number of poetry magazines, I consulted the electronic Ulrich’s Periodical Directory in 
January 2003 and selected poetry magazines (www.ulrichsweb.com), of which Ulrich’s listed 2153.   I 
sampled the first 250 of these and found 49 published in the U.S. and still listed as active.  Because many 
listings are designated “researched/unresolved,” I inflated the total estimate by about 20 percent above the 
figure one would obtain by projecting my sample to the whole. 
13 The rise of public funding for poetry and serious fiction during the 1970s contributed to an increase in 
the number of presses taking the nonprofit form (in order to make themselves eligible for grants from pub-
lic arts agencies or foundations).  Despite the presence of a few exemplars (e.g., the New Press, founded as 
a nonprofit with an explicit public-benefit mission, or Graywolf Press, which adopted the nonprofit form to 
become eligible for grants in the 1970s), by 2000 this tendency by 2000 it appeared to have stalled in the 
face of more cautious grant-making by public arts agencies eager to avoid controversial grants that attract 
legislative retribution (Mitchell 1985).  . 
14 The UDAO F_Inst field lists 658 organizations classified as nonprofit independent presses, but my 
inspection of a sample of 30 of these organizations suggests that only about half are properly classified, as 
the list includes both some organizations that are not presses and some presses that are not nonprofit in 
form (though some may be in mission). 
15 When dining establishments present plays they are classified under arts establishments as dinner theaters; 
when they present musicians, the Census classifies them as dining establishments.    
16 The only case in which for-profits and public agencies compete without nonprofits playing a more 
important role than at least one of the others is in the lending of feature films, where public libraries DiMaggio: Culture ---89--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
supplement provision by retail video lenders (from whom the practice elicits cries of “unfair competition”).  
This exception represents the complementarity of this function to libraries’ major role as lenders of books 
and recorded music, fields that public and nonprofit libraries monopolize.   
17 On the one hand, demand for the arts in large cities is more heterogeneous than demand in smaller 
places, which should make the nonprofit sector more important.  On the other hand, demand for the may be 
higher in cities, and public-choice theory would expect that this would increase public grant-making to arts 
groups, which is consistent with the observed facts.   A study of the relationship between cultural 
philanthropy  (a measure of demand) and the form and behavior of arts agencies would be illuminating.      
18 This assumption applies better to managers of firms that are accountable to investors than to the owner of 
an art-house movie theater or to a chamber trio that performs at weddings and dinner parties, of course. 
19 A 1993 task force of the American Symphony Orchestra League placed “orchestra leadership” near the 
top of a list of barriers to “achieving cultural diversity,” writing that “many orchestra boards have become 
large, entrenched structures that include people who have not kept abreast of changing community dynam-
ics and values” (National Task Force for the America Orchestra 1993: 41).  
20 See Cohen and March, 1974, for a similar argument about universities on which I have drawn.    
21 The influence of this trend even in the United States (which has lagged behind Europe and the Common-
wealth countries) is evident in the 1997 report of the American Assembly on “The Arts and the Public Pur-
pose,” a consensus document of a conference of leading nonprofit arts practitioners, with some represent-
ation of commercial interests and cultural grantmakers.   In the report’s opening sentences, the authors 
make two claims that are strikingly different from the themes of previous pronouncements of this kind: 
“The 92
nd American Assembly defined the arts inclusively – in a spectrum from commercial to not-for-
profit to volunteer, resisting the conventional dichotomies of high and low, fine and folk, professional and 
amateur, pop and classic.  This Assembly affirmed the interdependence of these art forms and the artists 
and enterprises that create, produce, present, distribute and preserve them, and underscored, in particular, 
the interdependence of the commercial and not-for-profit arts” (American Assembly 1997: 5).
 21   Both of 
these premises are analytically sensible.  They are also rhetorically powerful, for an arts sector that includes 
everything is, first, larger and more important and, second, can no longer be dismissed as an elite preserve.   DiMaggio: Culture ---90--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
At the same time, this statement of formal equality and interdependence among all forms of arts implicitly 
rejects the moral privileging of Euro-American high culture that was the dominant rationale for nonprofit 
enterprise in the arts for most of the 20
th century. 
22 www.paristranslatlantic.com/antheil/frameset.html.  Last accessed, March 17, 2003.  Antheil was a 
Trenton native.  The celebration was organized by an association of New Jersey composers and supported 
by local corporations, among others.   
23 The UDAO institution code for 117 indicates “business corporation,” which suggests that they are 
misclassified as nonprofits or that they have incorrect institution codes.  Visits to some web sites of 
organizations so designated suggests that the former is the case. 
24 The UDAO lists 432 nonprofit organizations in the jazz discipline, twice as many jazz organizations of 
any kind as were included in the Economic Census’s mail survey, and about thirty-five time as many non-
profits.   This reflects the fact that the Census restricts its coverage to performing organizations, whereas 
the UDAO includes jazz societies, service organizations, and even jazz museums.   Nonetheless, UDAO 
classified almost half of the jazz entries as regular performing groups and another 14 percent as amateur, 
youth, or school-affiliated performing organizations.   (It seems likely that Census includes most of the 
nonprofit jazz performing organizations identified by UDAO in nonspecific musical-performer categories.)  
Jazz organizations are identified using the discipline codes (F_DISC), and types within this classification 
are distinguished by cross-classifying F_DISC against the National Standard institution codes (F_INST).  
Visual inspection of organization names and consultation of their home pages suggests that some of these 
organizations are misclassified, either because they are actually blues bands or because they are really 
associations that sponsor concerts rather than actual performing groups. 
25 An interesting subset of jazz nonprofits comprises associations of middle-class, middle-aged white 
musical amateurs who perform together in public, but also promote occasional concerts by professional 
jazz artists.  (One web site lists fourteen such associations in the Los Angeles area alone, scheduling regular 
concerts or jam sessions at venues that include a local community college, Elks Club Lodges, American 
Legion Halls, and an International House of Pancakes [Valley Jazz Club 2002].)   
26 The UDAO lists 377 nonprofits in the ”ethnic” music field. DiMaggio: Culture ---91--- 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Based on UDAO lists and classifications, I estimate that there are roughly 900 to 1200 nonprofit and 
artist-cooperative galleries – considerably fewer than their proprietary counterparts, but a significant pro-
portion (perhaps 20 percent) nonetheless. This rough estimate is based on my analysis of web pages of a 
sample of 30 galleries that UDAO lists as nonprofit visual art galleries (separate from museums).  Of these, 
approximately a third appeared to proprietary art galleries misclassified as nonprofit, so I deducted that 
number (as well as a few extra, based on other forms of misclassification) from the total reported in this 
category, but then added an estimated 200 to 300 gallery-type operations listed under other headings.  It is 
likely that many such galleries are nonprofit mutual-benefit associations rather than 501(c)3 nonprofits. 
28 The field of software design and publishing adds plausibility to such speculation.   Most software is 
produced commercially by firms that sell it for profit.   But some very important and successful software 
programs, such as Linux or Apache, have been produced by informal networks of cooperating program-
mers, whose collective work is facilitated by networks both physical (the Internet) and reputational.   Al-
though economists might predict that most people would free ride on the efforts of others (or else be with-
hold their own contributions lest other designers profit from their efforts), such networks have been enorm-
ously effective, even without the credibility provided by formal organizations and nonprofit charters.   In-
deed, new legal instruments – for example, so-called “copylefts” by which software producers appropriate 
rights and then assign them to any user for free, with the sole condition that all further development remain 
in the public domain --- may provide an institutional basis for new forms of cultural production.  Even its 
advocates acknowledge that open source is not appropriate to every software project.  Yet the open-source 
movement suggests that, for some purposes, extensive, diffusely-connected, on-line peer-to-peer networks 
may present a viable organizational alternative to conventional nonprofit organizations (Raymond 2001). 